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ABSTRACT 
Three Essays on Child Maltreatment Prevention 
Jessica Pac 
This dissertation includes three papers that examine the role of antipoverty policies and programs 
in preventing child maltreatment. Paper one examines how access to Medicaid impacts child 
maltreatment as characterized by Child Protective Services (CPS) reports. Paper two considers 
how access to Early Childhood Education and Care (ECEC) programs affects child welfare 
involvement. Paper three assesses the relationship between temperature and CPS reporting, 
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This dissertation includes three papers that provide quasi-experimental evidence on new policy 
solutions for maltreatment prevention.  
Impoverishment is consistently associated with Child Protective Services (CPS) involvement, 
often experienced in conjunction with other forms of hardship that degrade the environmental 
and internal stability of the family, such as diminished mental and physical health and decreased 
labor force participation. By extension, ‘Parenting in despair’ – that under high levels of stress 
and depression coupled with constrained resources – may be amenable to policies and programs 
that ameliorate the parenting environment. Indeed, numerous causal studies have shown that the 
generosity of programs such as AFDC/TANF, EITC, and minimum wage appear to drive down 
CPS report rates. Yet, the maltreatment benefits of three of the largest social antipoverty 
programs remain unknown. The aim of this dissertation is to estimate the prevention effects of 
these policies.  
My first paper, “The Effect of Medicaid on Child Maltreatment: Evidence from Early 
Expansions in California” provides the first evidence of a reduction in maltreatment due to an 
exogenous increase in access to Medicaid through California’s early expansions using 
administrative data. I find that access to Medicaid reduced child physical abuse reports by up to 
11 percent. I detect much larger effects among children from historically disadvantaged homes, 
suggesting that Medicaid indeed improves child safety. My findings imply that Medicaid may 
indeed serve as a policy vehicle to improve family functioning and child safety.  
My second paper examines the role of Early Childhood Education and Care (ECEC) programs 
and child maltreatment. In this paper, entitled, “ECEC Programs in the United States: Does 
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Access Improve Child Safety?” I exploit the temporal and spatial variation in enrollment and 
subsidy shocks of the three largest, publicly funded ECEC programs to estimate their benefits in 
terms of four proximal measures of child maltreatment. My results imply that programs for 
young children (infants to two years old) may offer the largest welfare gains, though I find weak 
overall evidence of a benefit to expanded program access. That I fail to detect a lower-bound 
effect of ECEC programs in general gives further evidence to the notion that program quality 
appears paramount to expanding access.  
The findings from these papers imply that access to Medicaid affects child maltreatment through 
a reduction in stress and depression and through a contemporaneous increase in income, though I 
am unable to parse out explanatory mechanisms. For my third paper, I examine temperature as 
an interesting test for the stress pathway, as it is both exogenous and does not affect income (in 
the short run). To that end, “Hot Tempered: New Evidence on Temperature and Child 
Maltreatment” uses exogenous variation in temperature and acute heat exposure to provide the 
first estimates of the effect of temperature on child maltreatment among young children. I 
examine whether metropolitan-level air conditioning penetration rates and state-level LIHEAP 
cooling programs plausibly mitigate this relationship. I find that a 10 degree increase in 
temperature is associated with at minimum, a 4.7 percent increase in reports. While a/c 
penetration rates reduce the effects of temperature by up to 50 percent, existing LIHEAP state 
cooling programs fail to have an effect. These findings suggest that LIHEAP, or other programs 
that promote access to cooling, should be expanded to reach more low-income families with 
young children. 
Overall, my findings suggest that improving the context of parenting is not ignorable among 
myriad policy solutions. That policies such as Medicaid, ECEC programs, and LIHEAP can 
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improve child safety merits consideration among the possible approaches to prevention. Further, 
that a lack of access to the benefits remitted by these programs can increase maltreatment yields 





VI. Paper 1: The Effect of Medicaid on Child Maltreatment: Evidence from Early Expansions in 
California 
Abstract 
In this paper, I examine the effect of access to Medicaid on child maltreatment rates using 
administrative data capturing the full census of alleged child maltreatment reports in the U.S. 
between 2010 and 2013 (N= 4,755,579). To identify the effect of Medicaid, I exploit the 
exogenous variation in access to Medicaid by the county-level early expansions in California’s 
Low Income Health Program (LIHP) from 2011 – 2012. My most conservative estimates suggest 
that access to Medicaid significantly reduced reports of physical abuse by up to 11 percent. I 
detect ample effect heterogeneity, with larger effects among children from families with 
financial hardships and those historically disadvantaged. This paper provides new evidence to 
inform the Medicaid discussion, providing new evidence suggestive of the potentially costly 
consequences of a retraction of benefits or generosity. 
Introduction 
Child maltreatment in the United States is increasingly prevalent. An estimated 37.4 percent of 
children experience an investigation by Child Protective Services (CPS) before their 18th 
birthday (Kim, Wildeman, Jonson-Reid, & Drake, 2017). In 2016, states received 4.1 million 
CPS referrals for 7.4 million children, a 10 percent increase since 2012 (U.S. Department of 
Health & Human Services Families, Administration on Children Youth and Families, & Bureau, 
2016). As many adulthood inequalities appear to manifest in childhood, preventing early 
maltreatment is paramount (Almond & Currie, 2011; Almond, Currie, & Duque, 2017; Currie & 
Rossin-Slater, 2015; Heckman & Masterov, 2007). Children under 12 months in particular face 
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the greatest risk of undetected maltreatment, the consequences of which are grim. Not only do 
the youngest children have the highest victimization rates (24.8 per 1,000 children), they account 
for half of child maltreatment fatalities (U.S. Department of Health & Human Services Families 
et al., 2016). If the effects of maltreatment nearly disappear if treated before the age of two, as 
suggested by a long-running study of orphans in Bucharest, the long-run benefits of early 
intervention are likely vastly underestimated (Nelson et al., 2007).  
One fundamental challenge is to provide early and generous access to preventative services. An 
estimated 1.9 million children received prevention services in 2016 with another 1.3 million 
receiving post-investigation services,1 implying that the majority of victims – and the much 
larger population of unsubstantiated victims and those not captured by official statistics – never 
receive stabilizing support. The Family First Prevention Services (FFPS) Act of 2018 aims to 
broaden access to preventative services, allocating funding to States for the title IV-E 
reimbursement of substance abuse and other mental health services along with parental training. 
With the exception of home visiting programs, however, there is limited evidence as to the 
efficacy of most preventative programs (Levey et al., 2017). Further, as these and other 
preventative services are often prioritized by observed risk, meaning that receipt is contingent 
upon a prior interaction with CPS, researchers have turned to policy-based universal prevention 
strategies. Despite the fact that child maltreatment is epidemic in proportion with an estimated 
cost of up to $30 billion annually – with an additional $124 to $585 billion lifetime cost of each 





new case (Fang, Brown, Florence, & Mercy, 2012) – relatively little is established in the causal 
sense about large-scale policy solutions outside of those targeting parenting behavior.  
As poverty is the most prevalent risk factor for child maltreatment, a key policy question is 
whether sweeping improvements to the safety net can reduce the rate of violence against 
children. Indeed, numerous studies have shown in experimental and quasi-experimental contexts 
that an increase in income through cash assistance or tax credit programs reduces the odds of 
maltreatment (Berger, Font, Slack, & Waldfogel, 2016; Cancian, Yang, & Slack, 2013; Paxson 
& Waldfogel, 1999a, 2002, 2003b; Raissian & Bullinger, 2017; Wildeman & Fallesen, 2017). 
However, hardships do not occur in a vacuum. Multiple studies have shown that one form of 
hardship often proceeds another, resulting in cumulative and pronounced disadvantage. This 
explains why the most successful prevention programs – home visiting programs – target 
multiple hardships at once by heaping parenting interventions upon social interventions, 
connecting the highest-risk families with additional resources, income, and skillsets (García, 
Heckman, Leaf, & Prados, 2016; Olds, 2006).  Yet, this form of intervention may not be 
appropriate for the majority of at-risk families with fewer, more tractable hardships.  
Medicaid is a similarly holistic safety net program with evidence of important improvements to 
recipients beyond physical health. Previous studies have documented positive effects on 
recipients’ medical expenses and medical out-of-pocket spending (MOOP), improved mental 
health, and reductions in payday loans, suggesting that access to medical care might be a 
stabilizing source in impoverished households (Allen, Swanson, Wang, & Gross, 2017; 
Boudreaux, Gonzales, & Saloner, 2017; Hu, Kaestner, Mazumder, Miller, & Wong, 2016; 
Remler, Korenman, & Hyson, 2017; Wherry, Kenney, & Sommers, 2016b). Seventeen states 
have yet to expand Medicaid and several expansion states are presently considering a retraction 
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of benefits through either imposing work requirements or changing benefit levels. Many of the 
benefits of Medicaid are not fully understood, so a retraction of benefits (or failure to expand) 
could have negative externalities not accounted for by benefit-cost analysis. By one estimate, 
retraction of Medicaid benefits under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) 
would result in a loss of coverage for 2.8 million people with a substance use disorder, and 1.2 
million with a serious mental health disorder, two of the most prominent risk factors for 
perpetrators of child maltreatment (Frank & Glied, 2017). As medical reporters are the most 
prominent reporting source for infants – accounting for nearly one quarter of all reports for 
children under 12 months (see figure 1-1) – early prevention hinges on access to medical care. 
Given the ancillary evidence for Medicaid ameliorating the many contextual factors that put 
children at high risk for maltreatment, quantifying the direct benefits of Medicaid in a quasi-
experimental framework is an important policy imperative.  
In this paper, I provide the first evidence on the effect of Medicaid on young child maltreatment 
rates using the exogenous rollout of California’s Low Income Health Program (LIHP). Using 
detailed administrative data covering the census of CPS reports in 50 states from 2010 through 
2013 from the National Child Abuse and Neglect Data System (NCANDS), I compare the child 
maltreatment rates among children age five and younger in expansion counties to those non-
expansion counties within and outside of California. My findings broadly indicate that access to 
Medicaid indeed is associated with a reduction in child maltreatment, especially physical abuse 
among traditionally disadvantaged populations of young children.  
This paper proceeds as follows. After a brief discussion of child maltreatment and the policies 
aligned to protect children, I describe the Medicaid expansion and the three potential 
mechanisms through which I expect Medicaid to impact maltreatment rates. Following a 
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description of the five data sources, I describe my empirical approach and results. I employ a 
number of robustness checks – discussed in the following section – followed by a discussion and 
conclusion.  
Child Maltreatment 
Child maltreatment is broadly defined as “any recent act or failure to act on the part of a parent 
or caretaker which results in death, serious physical or emotional harm, sexual abuse or 
exploitation; or an act or failure to act, which presents an imminent risk of serious harm,” 
according to the Child Abuse and Treatment Act of 1988 (CAPTA), reauthorized in 2010 (P.L. 
111-320). As states and localities have the autonomy to further define child protection laws and 
employ the necessary enforcement, there is ample cross-state variation in the criteria for 
investigation and punishment. States tend to vary with respect to funding and the intensity of 
their responses as well, though there has been a general shift towards either keeping children in 
the home or placing them with relatives as opposed to non-relative foster care under Title IV-E 
of the Social Security Act.2 
Though there is some causal evidence that maltreatment is harmful to children’s short- and long-
term outcomes, the effect of maltreatment is difficult to disentangle from other factors such as 
family and neighborhood environments, socioeconomic disadvantage, prenatal and postnatal 
health investments, etc. that might differentiate maltreated children from those who are not 
maltreated. Thus, limited data availability and the absence of randomized studies robust causal 





inference in the majority of studies. Although attention has long been paid to the consequences 
of maltreatment across literature within the relevant disciplines, causal studies are rare for these 
reasons. Even within the studies that are closer to providing a well-identified effect of 
maltreatment, vast underreporting implies that the calculated effects may overestimate the true 
effects of maltreatment as only the more severe cases are detected and investigated and 
ultimately quantified (Currie & Spatz Widom, 2010). 
In the early health and development literature, child maltreatment can be theoretically 
conceptualized both as a shock to early health endowment and as a negative parental investment. 
For instance, prenatal maltreatment could result in differences in health at birth, as indicated by 
conditions such as Fetal Alcohol Syndrome (FAS) or Neonatal Abstinence Syndrome (NAS), the 
prevalence of which has markedly increased due to the opioid crisis. Similarly, child 
maltreatment can be perceived as a negative parental investment – in other words, that which 
occurs after birth. Conceived this way, maltreatment affects children across multiple domains of 
well-being; in the short-term, it has been linked to poorer outcomes in education, cognitive 
ability and employment, physical and mental health, and adverse behaviors. Two quasi-
experimental studies showed that maltreated children showed large and significant deficits in IQ, 
reading scores, and school performance (Currie & Widom, 2010a; Perez & Widom, 1994). 
Though the cumulative effects of maltreatment are scarcely known or studied, both studies found 
that the effects persisted into adulthood with the latter study finding a 14 percentage point gap 
employment and an $8,000 gap in earnings. Maltreatment has also been associated with a host of 
mental health outcomes, including internalizing behaviors such as anxiety and depression, 
externalizing behaviors such as aggression and perhaps not surprisingly, nearly all forms of 
childhood maltreatment are correlated with PTSD (see Gilbert et al., 2009 for a complete 
7 
 
review). Finally, maltreatment has also been linked with aggression, violence, and criminality 
through the lifespan (Currie & Tekin, 2006, 2012).  
Policy Background 
In 2010, California adopted an early Medicaid expansion program, the Low-Income Health 
Program (LIHP), using its “Bridge to Reform” §1115 Medicaid Demonstration Waiver matched 
at 50 percent with the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act’s (ACA) early expansion 
funding. LIHP expanded Medicaid eligibility up to 200 percent of the Federal Poverty Level 
(FPL), though counties enacted thresholds independently ranging from 138 percent to 200 
percent FPL. After January 2014, participants were auto-enrolled in Medi-Cal, California’s 
Medicaid program (or moved into marketplace insurance due to a change in eligibility status).  
Numerous studies have documented enrollment increases following California’s Medicaid 
expansion. Parents and adults who were previously ineligible enrolled at rates 30 percent higher 
compared to the pre-expansion rates. Although children were previously eligible for insurance 
coverage through CHIP up to 200 percent of the FPL, a handful of studies have documented 
boosts in children’s enrollments following an increase in the parental eligibility threshold 
(Hudson & Moriya, 2017; Ku & Broaddus, 2006). There is ample evidence of a ‘first stage’ 
effect of Medicaid expansions. In randomized control trials, the Medicaid expansion has been 
causally linked to an increase in healthcare utilization, an improvement in users’ self-reported 
overall health, and to a 30 percent decline in depression (Baicker et al., 2013a; Finkelstein et al., 
2012). Later quasi-experimental studies found that these improvements were partially explained 
through reductions in out-of-pocket medical spending, a reduction in medical debt, and reduced 
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poverty rates (Allen et al., 2017; Boudreaux et al., 2017; Hu et al., 2016; Remler et al., 2017; 
Wherry et al., 2016b).  
Access to Medicaid can benefit children in four primary ways.  First, there is ample evidence that 
access to Medicaid improves parental health care utilization and mental health (Baicker et al., 
2013b; Finkelstein et al., 2012). A healthier parent is more likely to work, is less prone to stress, 
and may be more likely to use and benefit from mental health services (Currie & Madrian, 2000). 
Medicaid coverage for substance addiction treatment and the many physical and mental health 
ailments known to afflict maltreating parents could mechanically improve the behavioral aspects 
of maltreatment as well.  
Second, access to Medicaid might benefit children through the contemporaneous increase in 
household income or a positive change in the household budget. Prior evidence has linked 
Medicaid access to reduced out-of-pocket medical expenditures (MOOP), a reduction in payday 
lending, a reduction in overall medical debt (Allen et al., 2017; Baicker et al., 2013b; Finkelstein 
et al., 2012; Hu et al., 2016) and lower poverty rates (Wherry, Kenney, & Sommers, 2016a).  
Children might benefit directly through increased investment as well as through a reduction in 
household stress. These may be important mechanisms given the established relationship 
between household income and child maltreatment rates. In a series of path-breaking studies 
using state-year aggregated data, Paxson and Waldfogel (1999; 2002; 2003) find ample evidence 
of a relationship between income, poverty and maltreatment. Their findings suggest that a 1-
percentage point increase in the fraction of children below 75 percent of the poverty threshold is 
associated with a 3.8 percent increase in the number of maltreatment cases. A series of 
randomized control trials found that a boost in annual income decreased maltreatment rates 
(Cancian et al., 2013; Wildeman & Fallesen, 2017), and a recent study found that the increase in 
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family income by about $1,000 annually from the EITC resulted in a reduction in neglect by 3 – 
4 percent and a reduction of CPS reports by 8 – 10 percent among low-income, single mother 
families (Berger et al., 2016).  
Access to Medicaid has consistently been found to directly increase healthcare utilization among 
children (see E. M. Howell and Kenney 2012). Increasing the eligibility threshold of parents 
appears to boost child enrollments as well (Hudson & Moriya, 2017; Ku & Broaddus, 2006). 
Medicaid has been found to reduce avoidable hospitalizations and infant/child mortality, two 
measures that may be correlated with maltreatment rates (Aizer, 2007; Bermudez & Baker, 2005; 
Bhatt & Beck-Sagué, 2018; Currie & Gruber, 1996; E. Howell, Decker, Hogan, Yemane, & 
Foster, 2010; Kaestner, Joyce, & Racine, 2001). Medicaid-spurred improvement in infant and 
child mortality rates might eventually shift the average population health of children through 
improved maternal health and prenatal care, leading to a decline in the number of children born 
with developmental disabilities and other limiting conditions linked to abuse and neglect. 
Furthermore, as pediatricians are a trusted resource for parents regarding child development and 
discipline strategies, physician access may directly improve parenting practices as well (Bass et 
al., 1993; Combs-Orme, Holden Nixon, & Herrod, 2011; Flaherty & Stirling, 2010; MacPhee, 
1984; Regalado, Sareen, Inkelas, Wissow, & Halfon, 2004; Taylor, Moeller, Hamvas, & Rice, 
2013). 
Finally, Medicaid could also directly benefit children through increased time with mandated 
reporters. If mandated reporting among physicians falls after a child reaches their first birthday, 
it could be that increasing face time with physicians could boost reporting among children 1 – 5. 
Further, the ACA allocations for home visiting programs could prevent long-term child 
maltreatment, benefiting children throughout their lifetime. This latter mechanism could 
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conversely result in an increase in reported maltreatment. As physicians are a primary mandated 
reporting source for young children, increased exposure could increase reporting rates. I consider 
and test for this possibility, as discussed in the empirical methodology section.  
Data 
My primary data includes the census of child maltreatment reports for children under six years in 
the National Child Abuse and Neglect Data System (NCANDS) from 2010 through 2013.  These 
data are collected biannually and administered by the National Data Archive on Child Abuse and 
Neglect housed at Cornell University. Though contribution is voluntary under the Child Abuse 
Prevention and Treatment Act of 1988, NCANDS has become the primary source for child 
maltreatment statistics in the United States. From 2010 through 2016, 51 states contributed data 
to NCANDS, all of which are included here with the exception of Puerto Rico, though I limit my 
primary estimations to the three-year county-month sample from January 1, 2010 through 
December 31, 2013 for a total of (N= 4,755,579) children aggregated to N=33,073 county-
months. There is substantial variation in report rates across county, as illustrated in the kernel 
density curve in figure 1-2.  
I use the 2010 Small Area Health Insurance Estimates (SAHIE) from the U.S. Census Bureau to 
estimate the pre-expansion, county-level insurance rates. Unlike estimates from the American 
Community Survey, these estimates include counties with populations under 65,000 and 
incorporate Medicaid enrollment rates to provide the most accurate county-level rates available. 
The 2010 Small Area Income and Poverty Estimates (SAIPE) provide the weighted and adjusted 
county-level poverty rates. I use the overall poverty rates, rather than that of children, to account 
for potential changes in parental eligibility. County population data comes from the National 
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Cancer Institute’s Surveillance, Epidemiology, and End Results Program (SEER) for the entire 
period of inquiry. I compile age-specific population estimates into a single estimate for the 
population of children under six. County-level unemployment rates come from the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics Local Area Unemployment Statistics (LAUS) for the same period.  
The many ways that previous authors have measured child maltreatment require distinction; 
maltreatment is an overall measure of child abuse and neglect and can be captured either as a 
behavioral approximation (see e.g. (Berger et al., 2016)), or as a count of screened-in 
maltreatment reports (Cancian et al., 2013). Though the latter is notoriously prone to 
underreporting and the former yields a rough approximation of overall maltreatment, both are 
commonly used to measure overall maltreatment rates in a population. Some studies measure 
CPS involvement with parental self-reports as well, however these are also prone to bias. It is 
common to separate neglect and abuse reports to detect treatment heterogeneity, which assists in 
understanding the pathways between poverty and maltreatment, as neglect -- which is often 
characterized by being in a state of resource scarcity -- may be more closely tied to income and 
economic disadvantage than other forms of maltreatment. Finally, several studies use Out of 
Home care (OOH) rates as an approximation for abuse and neglect. While typically borne out of 
data limitations, findings from these studies must be interpreted with caution, because 
differences in state policies, reporting mandates, and intervention methods (i.e. dual track 
responses) would skew the true distribution of child maltreatment rates.  
Accordingly, I use four primary outcome measures which are later disaggregated into 
maltreatment type. The first captures the raw CPS report rate per 100,000 children. Though this 
variable is right skewed, I include it for comparison with previous literature alongside a log-
transformed variable. In addition, I include two indicators for whether the alleged maltreatment 
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was substantiated and for whether the child was removed from the home and placed into foster 
care. As both of these may reflect substantive state-, county-, or agency-level differences in 
policy, the log of CPS reports provides the most robust measure.  
I use the American Community Survey from 2007 through 2013 for robustness checks, 
approximating maltreatment three ways. First, I construct a variable indicating whether a child is 
living without both parents, then iterate this variable as an indicator for whether the child and 
siblings are living without both parents. My third measure indicates whether a grandparent is 
caring for the child.   
Empirical Approach 
To estimate the causal effect of access to Medicaid on child maltreatment, I require a plausibly 
exogenous source of variation in Medicaid. If access to Medicaid is random (or quasi-random, as 
proposed here), the observed outcomes in an OLS model are more likely to be the result of 
differential access to Medicaid, as opposed to some other driving force. A conventional OLS 
model would be prone to bias due to selection into Medicaid and the presence of other 
unobserved factors that might contemporaneously predict Medicaid participation and maltreating 
behaviors. For instance, disabled or otherwise disadvantaged parents may be more likely to 
enroll in Medicaid and to maltreat their children. As disability status is unobserved, the effect of 
Medicaid would be biased away from zero. Therefore, I identify the effect of Medicaid using the 
temporal and spatial variation in the early California Medicaid expansion. Using a difference-in-
difference framework (DD), I compare the pre- and post- expansion abuse and neglect rates of 
children living in expansion counties to those in non-expansion counties, as characterized by 
equation 1 below.  
13 
 
(1) 𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑐𝑚 =  𝛼 +  𝛽 𝐶𝑐 + 𝜌𝑀𝑚 +  𝛾𝑋𝑐𝑚 +  𝜃𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑐𝑚 +  𝜀𝑐𝑚 
 
Maltreatment outcomes (𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑐𝑚) for children in county c in month m are measured as the 
number of reports per 100,000 children, are regressed on county- and month-fixed effects (𝐶 and 
𝑀, respectively), a vector of controls for child and family characteristics (X), and an indicator, 
POST, set to 1 for California counties beginning in the month of their expansion and thereafter, 
and 0 for all counties outside of California and those within California prior to expansion. The 
coefficient of interest 𝜃 represents the estimated intent-to-treat (ITT) effect of Medicaid on child 
maltreatment reports. County-level fixed effects account for static differences across counties 
and month effects account for temporal changes that affect all counties uniformly. County-
specific linear time trends are included in later models to account for other factors that vary 
across counties over time, such as compositional shifts in Medicaid-eligible populations or 
differential responses to the Great Recession. All regressions are executed using OLS models 
with White robust standard errors clustered at the county level and weighted by the county 
population of children younger than six years of age.  
A key assumption underlying the DD methodology is that absent the Medicaid expansion, the 
trends in maltreatment would have been indistinguishable across treated and untreated counties. 
Though this assumption – often referred to as the parallel trends assumption -- is inherently 
untestable, I explore the presence of pre-trends by regressing a trend variable with county-level 
indicators among the pre-treatment sample, as shown in equation (2) below.  
(2) 𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑐𝑚 =  𝛼 +  𝛾𝑋𝑐𝑚 +  𝛽 𝑇𝑅𝑐𝑚 +  𝜃𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑐𝑚 +  𝜌𝑇𝑅𝑥𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑐𝑚 +  𝜀𝑐𝑚 
 
𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇 indicates treatment status, equal to 1 for California counties with expanded Medicaid 
and 0 otherwise. TR is the linear time trends, and 𝜌 is the coefficient of interest, indicating 
whether the pre-treatment trend differs between the treated and control counties.  
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Omitted variable bias is another common threat to causality, where other unobserved factors that 
predict maltreatment are spuriously related to the error term. Accordingly, the key identifying 
assumption for causal inference is that access to Medicaid did not plausibly change the 
demographic characteristics of children prone to maltreatment, nor other factors that might affect 
reporting, especially among Medical personnel.  To test the first part of this assumption, I regress 
the child demographics on treatment status.  
With regard to the latter assumption, medical personnel have been designated mandated reporters 
in California since 1963, though at the time only physicians were noted and were responsible 
only for reporting physical abuse. California’s Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting Act 
(CANRA) of 1980, § 11165.7 part (21) expanded the list of responsible medical personnel to 
include the myriad of reporters mandated today. Two sections of CANRA were enacted in 2011 
or 2012, neither of which would have had any bearing on reporting behavior. The first, § 11167 
part (f) outlined the type of information collected on a report and the confidentiality rules for 
reporters. The second, clarified the definitions of substantiation, unfoundedness, and 
inconclusiveness (§  1165.12).3  
To ensure exact counterfactuals and to account for potential bias from omitted variables, I also 
estimate synthetic control models. This method ensures that the most precise counterfactual 
counties are used by creating a synthetic treated county based on the characteristics and pre-law 
trends in the outcome variable. The resulting synthetic county is a weighted combination of other 






untreated counties. The weights are selected such that the difference in the characteristics in the 
treated counties and the other counties is minimized. The weights sum to one and are estimated 
separately for each county. I employ the cross-validation method for selecting predictor weights 
(Abadie, Diamond, & Hainmueller, 2015).  
Results 
Table 1-1 shows the summary statistics. The children in the census of maltreatment reports have 
a mean age of 2.43 and are predominantly white. The vast majority of reports were 
unsubstantiated, and only 14 percent of reported children were eventually removed from their 
home and placed into foster care. In line with previous studies, 61.71 percent of the sample is 
comprised of children who were alleged victims of neglect and nearly 16 percent of physical 
abuse. Around 28 percent of the children’s caregivers reported having financial hardships at the 
time of the report, with an even greater percentage reporting receiving any type of public 
assistance. The majority of the children hail from unknown family structures at the time of the 
report. Of those for whom the family structure is known, cohabiting is the most common.  
Table 1-2 shows the primary results from DD estimations. In column 1 of panel A, the expansion 
is credited with 35 fewer reports per 100,000 children in a given county-month, a reduction of 
nearly 4 percent relative to the pre-expansion mean. When county-specific linear time trends are 
included, the effect falls to 10 reports per 100,000 children. Though insignificant, the direction 
and magnitude suggest that the effect is not negligible, and as I discuss later, is likely masked by 
competing heterogeneous effects. Turning to the reports disaggregated by maltreatment type, 
access to Medicaid drives down reports of physical abuse by 7.98 reports per 100,000 children 
per county-month and sexual abuse reports by 1.68 reports per 100,000 children. Panels C and D 
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show the estimates from the same model using the log of the reports as an outcome measure. As 
this variable is normally distributed, I consider these estimates less prone to bias and 
considerably more reliable. Access to Medicaid appears to reduce Physical abuse CPS reports by 
11 percent (panel D, column 2), representing the intent-to-treat effect (ITT), with similarly 
negligible effects on all other outcomes with one exception. There appears to be a rather large, 
negative effect on other types of maltreatment (column 6), with my preferred estimates 
suggesting a significant 78 percent decline in the number of maltreatment reports alleging an 
‘other’ type of maltreatment.  
In order to estimate the effect of the treatment-on-the-treated (TOT), I estimate the same model 
with a subset of counties for whom the exact compliance rate is available (appendix table 1-A2). 
The estimated average compliance rate in this set of counties was 28.5 percent as of 12/2012, 
yielding an implied TOT of 42 percent.4 Though not all CMSP counties are included in my 
primary sample, the average compliance rate among these counties is 28.8 percent,5 resulting in a 
TOT of 39 percent. In other words, for every 12,607 new enrollments, physical abuse CPS 
reports declined by 1 percent.  
Due to state- and county-level differences in defining and prosecuting child abuse and neglect, 
the raw CPS report rate is widely considered the best measure of maltreatment. However, prior 
studies assessing child maltreatment prevention strategies often use the rate of substantiated 
reports and removal (foster care rate) as proxy measures. Accordingly, table 1-1 through 1-3 
                                                 
 
4 ITT = .12 (column 2 panel B in table 1-A2), compliance = .28. For TOT = ITT/ compliance, the implied TOT = 
.42.  
5 An estimated 506,660 of the 1,757,000 eligible individuals enrolled = 28.52 % for CA  
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presents the same models as in table 1-2, using these two alternative measures. Note that the rate 
of substantiated reports appears unaffected in the full model (panel B column 1) and in the 
maltreatment subtype models. Interestingly, the foster care rate falls in most specifications (panel 
D). This could be an artifact of parental access to Medicaid, which may have resolved any 
tractable parenting issues that otherwise would have kept children in care. For instance, children 
whose parents were addicted to opioids would have gained access to treatment under the 
expansion, along with a laundry list of other physical and health benefits.  
I next probe whether my primary effects are being driven by county size. In table 1-4, I omit the 
weights and stratify three primary outcomes by an indicator for whether the observed county is 
above or below the median observed county population (using exclusively the log of the report 
rate). If small cell sizes were driving these effects, we would expect the small counties to have 
inflated coefficients. Fortunately, this is not the case, as seen when comparing columns 1-3 to 4-
5. In panels B and C, I present the results from models stratified by county poverty rates (B) and 
2010 insurance rates (C). I delimit counties in the same way, coding an indicator with “1” if the 
county is at or above the observed median and “0” if below. If these results are in fact being 
driven by the Medicaid expansion, we would expect to see larger effects in more disadvantaged 
counties (panels B and C, columns 4, 5, and 6). My results generally support this assertion, with 
the exception of all reports having a larger, significant negative effect in counties with high 
insurance rates (column 1).  
Effect Heterogeneity  
Prior evidence suggests that a retraction of Medicaid benefits could be particularly detrimental so 
historically underrepresented subgroups of the population. Under previous expansions, Medicaid 
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was accredited for reducing maternal mortality and infant mortality, increasing overall access to 
care and healthcare utilization, and reducing the general burden of medical debt. To that end, in 
this section, I further disaggregate by child characteristics and other markers of disadvantage. 
For the remainder of the paper, I retain only my preferred specifications with log outcomes and 
county-specific linear time trends.  
Table 1-5 presents the results from equation (1) on the full sample for major maltreatment type, 
substantiation, and foster care disaggregated by child race/ethnicity. Though the effects for Black 
and Other children are relatively larger, up to 19 percent, the effect for White children is 
relatively large as well. The foster care rate follows the same general pattern, though the 
strongest effects appear among White children. These results suggest that children of 
traditionally disadvantaged race/ethnicities face a significant increase of physical abuse by up to 
19 percent and around a 2 percent increase in foster care in the counterfactual world without 
Medicaid. The smaller effects among Hispanic children could be due to the fact that enrollment 
is conditional upon citizenship, a question verifiable in future research with CPS reports and 
insurance status in the same data.  
As newborns  were auto-enrolled in SCHIP for their first year, it is unsurprising that the effect 
among infants (< 12 months) is relatively small and insignificant. In California, the income 
eligibility limits for infants was  higher (200% FPL) compared to that of older children, so this 
age group in particular would only directly benefit from the expansion by enrollment of older 
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siblings, parents, and relatives.6 Most other ages appear to benefit, though the one year olds to a 
much greater degree. All age groups see a decline in foster care rates, following the same pattern 
as the results in table 1-2. In table 1-7, the same models are disaggregated by child gender. 
Though both genders benefit from Medicaid in terms of significantly reduced physical abuse, 
females benefit more than males, by nearly 8 percentage points (14 percent relative to six 
percent). The foster care benefits are evident in these models as well.  
 At the time of the CPS report, the child’s primary caregiver was asked whether they 
relied on any type of public assistance. Table 1-8 shows the same DD models stratified by this 
indicator. Families who answered ‘yes’ saw a 25 percent reduction in all reports, a 28 percent 
reduction in physical abuse and a 20 percent reduction in neglect, all significant at 95 percent or 
higher. Though the results for physical abuse among the more advantaged families retain 
significance, the magnitude of the effect is nearly half that as the disadvantaged families. Not 
only do these results give further support to the notion that these effects are being driven by 
Medicaid, but they reveal a potential direct pathway through which children might benefit – if 
families are on public assistance with and without Medicaid, then these effects can be attributed 
to Medicaid alone, as the sole source of variation in these effects. Unlike the previous models, 
children from disadvantaged families see a small but significant reduction in neglect, suggesting 
that Medicaid may curtail maltreatment by relaying additional resources and benefits that the 
absence of which would be classified as neglect.  
                                                 
 
6 Repeating this analysis without infants yields the same results (available upon request). 
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If children gain access to Medicaid through their caregivers, the surveillance hypothesis posits 
that increased time with medical personnel resulting from increased medical care access and 
usage can result in an increase in reports. To test this assertion, I stratify the same models by an 
indicator for whether the reporter was medical or non-medical, as shown in table 1-9. The effect 
on medical reporters is negative, undermining the surveillance hypothesis. However, it is 
important to note that if the decrease in reports by medical personnel is offset by an increase in 
non-medical personnel, the spillover effects of the law could only be interpreted as a substitution 
effect away from medical reporters, rather than an actual change in child maltreatment. 
Conversely, reports fall among both groups of reporters, giving further credence to an absolute 
reduction in maltreatment.   
Robustness Checks  
To further probe the robustness of these results, I turn to the American Community Survey 
(ACS) approximating for child maltreatment with an indicator for whether a child was living out 
of the home at the time of the survey in the same time period.  As the ACS has more detailed 
information on household and family characteristics, I similarly specify the sample, retaining 
only children under six years of age from 2010 through 2013. As the child’s maltreatment status 
is unobservable (as in most major household surveys), I construct an indicator for whether the 
child is living with either parent, so that children living without a parent is equal to one, and zero 
otherwise. Parallel measures in the ACS indicate whether all children in the household are living 
without parents, and whether children are living with grandparents. These are only included as 
subsidiary outcomes as they exclude children living with other kin or relatives.  
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I employ the same difference-in-difference model as in equation (1), shown in panel A of table 
1-10, and include county-specific linear time trends as shown in panel B. Though the sample is 
markedly larger, the effects follow the same general pattern as my primary data, albeit at 
diminished significance. Children are .04 percentage points less likely to be living without their 
parents (25.96 percent of the pre-treatment mean) and .03 percentage points less likely to be 
living with a grandparent (both significant at 10 percent). However, the effects are considerably 
larger, up to 26 percent of the pre-expansion mean, suggesting that there is likely some 
additional heterogeneity not captured by these specifications. These results give further credence 
to my primary findings.  
If access to Medicaid is the source of reduction in child maltreatment reports, we would expect 
to see a similar pattern from the 2014 ACA expansion. Though the rollout was at the state level, 
26 states enacted an expansion January 1, 2014, with another five in the following five years. 
The results, shown in table 1-11, follow the same general pattern, though in the preferred 
specification with state-specific linear time trends, only the coefficient on the number of reports 
remains marginally significant. This could be because uptake rates are not observable in these 
data, and because other, related policies resulted in a surge of funding in the same period, 
degrading the variation needed for identification. Further, when I restrict the sample to California 
alone, the same pattern emerges, albeit with much less power (panel B).  
One further possibility that would undermine the DD approach would be if caregivers 
manipulated their treatment assignment – for example, moving into a county to become 
Medicaid-eligible –resulting in an effect that captures both a shift in the eligible population and 
the effect of access to Medicaid. To rule out this possibility, I regress on the treatment indicator a 
set of child characteristics. These results (available upon request) suggest that this possibility is 
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weak at best, with marginal significance in one indicator for children’s age.  Overall, there is no 
evidence to suggest that treatment group manipulation is problematic.   
If pre-trends in the outcome variables vary between Medicaid expansion and non-expansion 
counties, the credibility of these results would decline, as the effect could be biased by factors 
other than Medicaid. To test this assumption, I estimate equation (2) on the pre-treatment 
sample, shown in table 1-12. The first row indicates that there is no significant difference 
between the outcomes across the top in the treated and untreated counties, implying that the 
parallel trends assumption is met. However, the results from the dynamic policy effects model I 
estimate in the following section suggest that this assumption may be violated, urging a 
conservative interpretation of the results on all reports and neglect reports. Conversely, physical 
abuse reports appear to be entirely free of pre-trends, giving further credence to the reliability of 
my estimates.  
Another threat to validity is the theoretical construction of a control group. If the control group 
fails to represent a perfect counterfactual, the observed differences in report rates could be biased 
away from zero, capturing other nuances in unobserved heterogeneity. To test this possibility, I 
employ a synthetic control estimation, averaging across the county treatment effects, the 
difference between California and synthetic California, to generate figure 1-2 using a lowess 
estimator. The vertical dashed line represents the average month in which Medicaid was 
expanded across all California counties. The treatment effect for all CPS reports and neglect 
reports is positive in the pre-expansion period, followed by negligible effects in the post-
expansion period. This pattern suggests that Medicaid may have been expanded in counties with 
relatively high CPS reports pre-expansion. Alternatively, the null effects in the pre-expansion 
period followed by negative effects post-expansion for physical abuse reports follows the pattern 
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that emerges from my primary results. Comparing the estimated treatment effects to the reported 
compliance rate in figure 1-3, it is clear that high-compliance counties have relatively larger 
estimated treatment effects in all three outcomes.  
As one final robustness check, I test to see whether the variation produced by the counties who 
expanded in the two primary expansion periods (7/2011 and 1/2012) is adequate to produce the 
same results. To test this, I aggregate the data to the county subtype (those who expanded in each 
of two periods as well as non-expansion states) x six-month-block x maltreatment type and 
employ the same DD design. The raw plot of CPS reports (figure 1-A1 in the appendix) reveals 
the pattern we would expect, with a drop in abuse reports following each expansion. The DD test 
yields the expected coefficients, however the effect is much larger for all reports than for abuse 
reports (table 1-A3). Note that because all other non-expansion counties are in a single group, 
this check is less robust than the synthetic control estimation (results shown in figure 1-2). 
Unlike this check, the control counties include only those deemed to be statistically similar to 
each treated county, such that the control group is a more plausible counterfactual.  
Dynamic policy effects 
 If California’s early Medicaid expansions were truly exogenous, we would expect to see 
little or no discernable change in maltreatment reports before the expansion, and a large, 
cumulative effect after the expansion. To test this assertion, I implement an event study model, 
where I allow individual three-month period to enter the model as leads and lags, rather than the 
post indicator in equation (1). Accordingly, I estimate the following equation: 
(3) 𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑐𝑚 =  𝛼 +  𝛽 𝐶𝑐 + 𝜌𝑀𝑚 +  𝛾𝑋𝑐𝑚 + ∑ 𝜃𝑗𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑐𝑚
𝑗






 is a series of dummy variables equal to 1 for the counties in which the expansion 
was in place for 𝑗 periods, 𝐽 ={-12, -9, -6, -3, 0, 3, 6, 9, 12} with the three-month of the 
expansion as the omitted category (0). I estimate models with and without county-specific linear 
time trends, though only report the latter as these represent my more conservative estimates.  
The results for all CPS reports are shown in figure 1-4. The top panel shows the coefficients for 
the full sample, followed by physical abuse reports only in the center panel and neglect reports in 
the last panel.  The results in the full sample (top panel) follow the same pattern as the synthetic 
controls, suggesting that the models with county-specific linear time trends are the most robust, 
as these are more likely to account for any unobserved heterogeneity. In accordance with the DD 
model findings, Medicaid appears to have the largest effect on physical abuse rates (bottom 
panel), especially in the months immediately after the expansion.  
Discussion and Conclusion  
This study provides the first evidence that access to Medicaid may reduce violence against 
children. Motivated by the evidence linking the early childhood environment with lifelong health 
and human capital production, early access to Medicaid might ameliorate the economic, 
cognitive, and mental and physical health disparities associated with childhood abuse and neglect 
(Berger & Waldfogel, 2011; Currie & Tekin, 2006; Currie & Widom, 2010a; Gilbert et al., 2009; 
Perez & Widom, 1994; Robinson et al., 2012). I identify the effect of access to Medicaid by the 
quasi-experimental variation due to California’s county-level Low Income Health Program in 
2011 – 2012. I find that children experienced an 11 percent reduction in reports alleging physical 
abuse, though these effects are notably larger among more disadvantaged children. Children 
living in homes with financial hardships see a 28 percent reduction in maltreatment reports, and 
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those who are either Black or Other race/ethnicities benefit by up to 19 percent of the pre-
expansion mean. My results are robust to synthetic controls analysis and alternative data samples 
and specifications.  
As Medicaid under ACA was not designed to prevent child abuse, these striking findings inform 
Medicaid’s overall cost-benefit calculation and provide a new strategy for practitioners and 
legislators seeking to reduce maltreatment and the costs thereof. Though the potential 
mechanisms remain theoretical, ancillary evidence points to multiple, cumulative facets of 
disadvantage that may result in a reduction of maltreatment rates, including stability of the 
household budget, a reduction in stress and depressive symptoms, and an overall improvement in 
parental and child health. Future researchers should identify ways to test these mechanisms using 
data that capture both child maltreatment status and insurance status. Though there is a great deal 
of evidence pointing to income effects, per se, little is known about the cumulative effects of 
combining income supplementation with insurance, or other holistic improvements to the 
parenting context. Home visiting programs provide perhaps the best evidence of this type, 
though due to their high relative cost and general preference for families known to CPS, the vast 
majority of at-risk children are ineligible for their benefits.  
The effects I detect here are well within the range detected in previous studies, though the effects 
here are concentrated on physical maltreatment. Medicaid remits around $500 per year in terms 
of financial benefits in addition to the many non-financial benefits I discuss at length above, 
implying that my effects should align with those from both cash and in-kind programs. Several 
previous studies detect a reduction in child maltreatment due to safety net and other antipoverty 
programs. One such study used an existing randomized control trial to identify the effect of 
additional child support received on child maltreatment rates among a large sample of TANF 
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recipient families in Wisconsin (Cancian et al., 2013). The additional child support was garnered 
through a full pass-through and disregard, causing an increase in annual family incomes by 
around $170 compared to the control groups. Though it appears small, the treatment group saw a 
10 percent reduction in the odds of being screened-in for a child maltreatment investigation, 
representing a 2-percentage point reduction over a two-year period. A later study using Danish 
registry data found a similar effect, albeit with a much larger increase in income (Wildeman & 
Fallesen, 2017). Identified by a 2004 law that effectively lowered the welfare payment ceilings, 
the authors find that the resulting 30 percent reduction in income was associated with a 1.5 
percentage point increase in the odds that a child was involved in CPS, or, a 25 percent increase 
in the annual risk of CPS involvement. The increase in income was equivalent to around $4,800 
per year, yet the effect was similar in magnitude, suggesting that these results may not perfectly 
translate to the US context. Although both studies are limited in generalizability due to their 
sample of welfare recipients, the overall pattern of causal and observational studies is highly 
suggestive of a causal effect of income on child maltreatment (see also Berger and Waldfogel 
2004; Slack, Lee, and Berger 2007). Paxson and Waldfogel (2002; 2003) find that welfare 
reform is correlated with child maltreatment as well; benefit reductions appear to increase 
caseloads, and various measures of generosity – benefit levels, lifetime limits, sanctions, work 
requirements -- appear to have a similar effect (more generous policies yield lower caseloads). 
These effects are also relatively large; a 10 percent increase in welfare benefits is associated with 
a reduction in OOH care by nearly 8 percent. The latter finding suggest that even if welfare 
reform had competing effects (improved the lives of some and diminished that of others), the net 
effect on child maltreatment was overall negative. That welfare reforms generated negative 
externalities in child maltreatment rates was the same conclusion drawn by later authors as well 
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(Wildeman & Fallesen, 2017). Other safety net programs appear to affect child maltreatment 
rates, presumably through the family budget as well. Although Paxson and Waldfogel (2003) 
failed to detect the effect of EITC state benefit levels on child maltreatment, a later study 
identified the effect of EITC generosity using an instrumental variable approach that takes 
advantage of the geographic and temporal variation in state EITC benefit structures (Berger et 
al., 2016). Drawn from a longitudinal sample of families from the Fragile Families and Child 
Wellbeing Study, the authors find that the EITC instrument caused a first-stage increase in 
family income by about $1,000 annually, resulting in a reduction in neglect by 3 – 4 percent and 
a reduction of CPS reports by 8 – 10 percent among low-income, single mother families. These 
results are robust to control function methods and to other samples, indicating that the permanent 
shifts in income experienced by these families substantially reduced neglect and CPS reports, but 
not physical abuse. Several studies found that other factors such as foreclosure rates (Berger et 
al., 2015; Frioux et al., 2014; Wood et al., 2012), minimum wage (Raissian & Bullinger, 2017), 
and gasoline prices (McLaughlin, 2017) appear to predict a reduction in maltreatment as well. 
The latter two effect sizes are particularly interesting; a $1 increase in the minimum wage 
appears to reduce neglect reports by 9.6 percent, and a $1 increase in gasoline prices increases 
the overall maltreatment rate by 6.42 percent. 
Despite the growing evidence of the importance of reducing child maltreatment in early 
childhood, the large-scale strategies for doing so are not well understood outside of parenting 
interventions and home visiting programs. Additional information is needed on the precise 
factors that contribute to mandatory reporting, and the conditions under which children benefit 
the most. One key question from this analysis is why reports among medical personal plummet 
after a child’s first birthday, and why child care providers initiate such a small percentage of 
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reports. Though with this evidence, expanding Medicaid access and eligibility may be a useful 
strategy for improving the early parenting environment and early child health.  
Figures 
Figure 1-1: Variation in CPS Report rates by county  
 
Note: Total alleged maltreatment reports to Child Protective Services (CPS) among children 












Figure 1-2: Synthetic control effects (lowess smoothed)  
 
Note: Synthetic control models estimating the effect of Medicaid access on all reports, neglect 
reports, and physical abuse reports. Lines represent the average effects across counties using a 
lowess estimator. NCANDS administrative records of alleged child maltreatment reports 2010 – 
2013 collapsed to the county level (N = 4,755,579). Covariates are included in the weighting 
stage for all models (county-level unemployment rate, county-level poverty rate, child race, child 










Figure 1-3: Synthetic control estimates by compliance rate 
 
Note: This figure shows the treatment effect by county-level compliance (uptake) rate. Synthetic 
control models estimating the effect of Medicaid access on CPS reports. NCANDS 
administrative records of alleged child maltreatment reports 2010 – 2013 collapsed to the county 
level (N = 4,755,579). Covariates are included in the weighting stage for all models (county-

















Note: Event history models are estimated using OLS weighted by the county population of 
children under six years of age. White robust standard errors are clustered at the county level. 
NCANDS administrative records of alleged child maltreatment reports 2010 – 2013 collapsed to 
the county level (N = 4,755,579). Covariates are included in all models (county-level 
unemployment rate, county-level poverty rate, child race, child age, family structure). LTT = 
linear time trends. State and month fixed effects are included as well. Vertical lines indicate 95 














Table 1-2: Difference-in-Difference (DD) estimation 












A: Rate per 100,000           
Treat*Post -35.22** -7.98** -6.18 -1.68* -1.84 -2.78 
 (15.59) (2.80) (9.19) (0.64) (8.43) (2.93) 
r2 0.89 0.83 0.88 0.64 0.89 0.92 
B: Rate per 100,000, with county-specific linear time trends     

















Financial hardships 0.28 0.45





Kin / OOH 2.86%






 (7.04) (1.47) (6.17) (0.42) (3.77) (3.11) 
r2 0.91 0.86 0.90 0.67 0.92 0.93 
C: Log(reports)             
Treat*Post -0.09*** -0.10* -0.01 -0.09* -0.20 -0.26* 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.18) (0.10) 
r2 0.95 0.93 0.95 0.88 0.94 0.93 
D: Log(reports), with county-specific linear time trends       
Treat*Post -0.03 -0.11*** -0.01 -0.06 -0.02 -0.78*** 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.07) (0.09) 
r2 0.97 0.94 0.97 0.88 0.95 0.95 
N 33,073 31,284 32,691 26,123 10,583 8,643 
 
Note: OLS models weighted by the county population of children under six years of age. White 
robust standard errors are clustered at the county level. NCANDS administrative records of 
alleged child maltreatment reports 2010 – 2013 collapsed to the county level (N = 4,755,579). 
Covariates are included in all models (county-level unemployment rate, county-level poverty 
rate, child race, child age, family structure). LTT = linear time trends. State and month fixed 
effects are included as well. Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Table 1-3: DD estimation, alternative measures 
 












A: Log(reports), with county-LTT         
Treat*Post -0.03 -0.11*** -0.01 -0.06 -0.02 -0.78*** 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.07) (0.09) 
r2 0.97 0.94 0.97 0.88 0.95 0.95 
N 33,073 31,284 32,691 26,123 10,583 8,643 
       
B: Log(reports), with county-LTT and in CA, excluding CMSP counties   
Treat*Post -0.02 -0.12*** 0.00 -0.05 0.01 -0.78*** 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.08) (0.09) 
r2 0.97 0.94 0.97 0.89 0.95 0.95 
N 32,066 30,316 31,685 25,342 9,606 8,587 
 
Note: OLS models weighted by the county population of children under six years of age. White 
robust standard errors are clustered at the county level. NCANDS administrative records of 
alleged child maltreatment reports 2010 – 2013 collapsed to the county level (N = 4,755,579). 
Covariates are included in all models (county-level unemployment rate, county-level poverty 
rate, child race, child age, family structure). State and month fixed effects are included as well. 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 1-4: DD estimation, stratified models 
 














A: County Size             
  Above.  Median County Pop. Below Median County Pop. 
Treat*Post -0.12*** -0.18*** -0.03 -0.57* -0.15 -0.53 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) 0.32  (0.25) (0.28) 
r2 0.90 0.85 0.91 0.43 0.59 0.60 
N 20,674 20,260 20,590 12,399 11,024 12,101 
B: County Poverty Rates           
  Above Median Income Below Median Income 
Treat*Post -0.08** -0.07 -0.01 -0.11** -0.15*** -0.03 
 (0.04) (0.06) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.08) 
r2 0.97 0.95 0.97 0.91 0.88 0.92 
N 16,594 15,497 16,427 16,479 15,787 16,264 
C: County Uninsured Rates           
  Below Median Uninsured Rate Above Median Uninsured Rate 
Treat*Post -0.09** -0.08 -0.03 -0.05 -0.13** 0.09 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.09) 
r2 0.97 0.94 0.96 0.89 0.89 0.92 
N 16,741 15,842 16,663 16,332 15,442 16,028 
 
Note: Panel A shows OLS models. Panels B and C show OLS models weighted by the county 
population of children under six years of age. White robust standard errors are clustered at the 
county level. NCANDS administrative records of alleged child maltreatment reports 2010 – 2013 
collapsed to the county level (N = 4,755,579). Covariates are included in all models (county-
level unemployment rate, county-level poverty rate, child race, child age, family structure). State 
and month fixed effects are included as well. Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Table 1-5: DD estimates stratified by child race/ethnicity 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  






A: White           
Treat*Post 0.00 -0.14** 0.01 -0.01 -0.02** 
 (0.02) (0.06) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) 
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r2 0.94 0.88 0.93 0.56 0.96 
N 32,904 29,370 32,394 32,904 28,322 
B: Black           
Treat*Post -0.03 -0.15** -0.02 0.01 -0.02** 
 (0.03) (0.06) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) 
r2 0.96 0.91 0.95 0.42 0.94 
N 29,527 20,353 27,678 29,527 23,001 
C: Hispanic           
Treat*Post -0.02 -0.07** -0.01 0.00 -0.02** 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) 
r2 0.97 0.93 0.96 0.37 0.93 
N 27,828 17,245 24,745 27,828 20,316 
D: Other           
Treat*Post -0.03 -0.19*** 0.02 0.02** -0.02** 
 (0.04) (0.07) (0.05) (0.01) (0.01) 
r2 0.92 0.82 0.90 0.29 0.93 
N 23,701 12,466 20,341 23,701 17,260 
 
Note: OLS models weighted by the county population of children under six years of age. White 
robust standard errors are clustered at the county level. NCANDS administrative records of 
alleged child maltreatment reports 2010 – 2013 collapsed to the county level (N = 4,755,579). 
Covariates are included in all models (county-level unemployment rate, county-level poverty 
rate, child age, family structure). All models include state fixed effects, month fixed effects, and 
county-linear time trends. Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Table 1-6: DD estimates stratified by child age 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  






A: Infant (< 12m)         
Treat*Post -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02*** 
 (0.02) (0.08) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
r2 0.96 0.89 0.95 0.63 0.96 
N 32,409 21,935 31,505 32,409 26,882 
B: One year           
Treat*Post 0.00 -0.21*** 0.05 0.00 -0.02*** 
 (0.02) (0.08) (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) 
r2 0.96 0.87 0.94 0.54 0.96 
N 32,276 21,412 31,241 32,276 25,310 
C: Two years           
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Treat*Post -0.03* -0.15*** -0.01 0.01 -0.02*** 
 (0.02) (0.06) (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) 
r2 0.96 0.87 0.94 0.54 0.96 
N 32,421 22,818 31,399 32,421 25,344 
D: Three 
Years           
Treat*Post -0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.00 -0.02*** 
 (0.03) (0.06) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) 
r2 0.96 0.88 0.94 0.54 0.96 
N 32,524 23,820 31,406 32,524 25,318 
E: Four years           
Treat*Post -0.02 -0.15*** -0.02 0.01 -0.02*** 
 (0.02) (0.05) (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) 
r2 0.96 0.89 0.94 0.53 0.95 
N 32,582 24,522 31,379 32,582 25,316 
F: Five years           
Treat*Post -0.04** -0.11** 0.00 0.00 -0.02** 
 (0.02) (0.05) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) 
r2 0.95 0.89 0.93 0.53 0.96 
N 32,576 25,316 31,364 32,576 25,183 
 
Note: OLS models weighted by the county population of children under six years of age. White 
robust standard errors are clustered at the county level. NCANDS administrative records of 
alleged child maltreatment reports 2010 – 2013 collapsed to the county level (N = 4,755,579). 
Covariates are included in all models (county-level unemployment rate, county-level poverty 
rate, child race, child age, family structure). All models include state fixed effects, month fixed 
effects, and county-linear time trends. Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. 
 
Table 1-7: DD estimates stratified by child gender 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 






A: Female           
Treat*Post -0.02 -0.14*** -0.01 0.00 -0.02*** 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) 
r2 0.97 0.92 0.96 0.71 0.97 
N 32,919 28,807 32,380 32,919 28,238 
B: Male           
Treat*Post -0.03* -0.06* -0.01 0.00 -0.02*** 
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 (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) 
r2 0.97 0.93 0.96 0.71 0.97 
N 32,930 29,947 32,455 32,930 28,321 
 
Note: OLS models weighted by the county population of children under six years of age. White 
robust standard errors are clustered at the county level. NCANDS administrative records of 
alleged child maltreatment reports 2010 – 2013 collapsed to the county level (N = 4,755,579). 
Covariates are included in all models (county-level unemployment rate, county-level poverty 
rate, child race, child age, family structure). All models include state fixed effects, month fixed 
effects, and county-linear time trends. Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. 
 
Table 1-8: DD estimates stratified by financial hardship 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 






A: No Public Assistance         
Treat*Post 0.01 -0.18 ** -0.06 0.00 -0.01 
 (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.03) (0.01) 
r2 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.61 0.94 
N 17,227 14,027 16,311 17,227 14,540 
B: Public Assistance         
Treat*Post -0.25*** -0.28** -0.2** 0.02 0.00 
 (0.08) (0.13) (0.09) (0.02) (0.01) 
r2 0.94 0.91 0.93 0.59 0.92 
N 14,730 10,065 13,810 14,730 13,539 
 
Note: OLS models weighted by the county population of children under six years of age. White 
robust standard errors are clustered at the county level. NCANDS administrative records of 
alleged child maltreatment reports 2010 – 2013 collapsed to the county level (N = 4,755,579). 
Covariates are included in all models (county-level unemployment rate, county-level poverty 
rate, child race, child age, family structure). All models include state fixed effects, month fixed 
effects, and county-linear time trends. Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1.   
 
Table 1-9: DD estimates stratified by reporter type 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  








A: Non-Medical Reporters         
Treat*Post -0.03 -0.09*** -0.01 0.00 -0.02*** 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) 
r2 0.97 0.94 0.96 0.75 0.97 
N 33,031 30,935 32,642 33,031 28,893 
B: Medical Reporters         
Treat*Post -0.03 -0.16* -0.01 0.00 -0.01* 
 (0.03) (0.09) (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) 
r2 0.93 0.85 0.91 0.57 0.93 
N 29,951 19,510 27,122 29,951 23,231 
 
Note: OLS models weighted by the county population of children under six years of age. White 
robust standard errors are clustered at the county level. NCANDS administrative records of 
alleged child maltreatment reports 2010 – 2013 collapsed to the county level (N = 4,755,579). 
Covariates are included in all models (county-level unemployment rate, county-level poverty 
rate, child race, child age, family structure). All models include state fixed effects, month fixed 
effects, and county-linear time trends. Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. 
 
Table 1-10: DD estimates, robustness checks with American Community Survey data 











A: Fixed effects only     
Treat*Post -0.005* -0.004* -0.003** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
r2 0.02 0.03 0.08 
B: Fixed effects and county-
LTT     
Treat*Post -0.003 -0.004* -0.003* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
r2 0.02 0.02 0.04 
N 793,734 793,734 793,734 
 
Note: Panel A shows estimates of equation (1) using child-level OLS regressions with White 
robust standard errors clustered at the county-level.  Panel B shows the same model as panel A, 
however with county-linear time trends included. OLS models weighted by the county 
population of children under six years of age. American Community Survey data 2010 – 2013. 
Covariates are included in all models (household head education, child race, child age). All 
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models include state fixed effects and year fixed effects.  Standard errors in parentheses, *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Table 1-11: DD estimates, robustness checks  
 






A: State-level ACA Expansion     
Treat*Post -0.09* -0.12* -0.08 
 (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) 
r2 0.96 0.93 0.96 
N 51,783 48,857 51,165 
B: California Counties Only     
Treat*Post -0.04 -0.05* -0.01 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) 
r2 0.99 0.97 0.99 
N 1,727 1,687 1,726 
 
Note: Panel A shows estimates for the 2014 state-level expansion, with White robust standard 
errors clustered at the level of the state. Panel B shows the estimates with California counties 
only, omitting all other states, with White robust standard errors clustered at the county level. 
OLS models weighted by the county population of children under six years of age. NCANDS 
administrative records of alleged child maltreatment reports 2010 – 2013 collapsed to the county 
level (N = 4,755,579). Covariates are included in all models (county-level unemployment rate, 
county-level poverty rate, child race, child age, family structure). All models include state fixed 
effects, year fixed effects, and linear time trends. Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Table 1-12: Test of pre-trends in outcome variables 
 











Trend*Treat 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Trend 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Treat 0.20 -0.60*** 0.86*** -0.12*** -0.91*** 
 (0.13) (0.08) (0.12) (0.02) (0.02) 
40 
 
Constant 6.83*** 3.38*** 2.90*** 0.19*** 0.19*** 
  (0.49) (0.24) (0.31) (0.05) (0.05) 
N 12,301 11,686 12,176 12,301 10,365 
r2 0.96 0.94 0.96 0.80 0.98 
 
Note: OLS models weighted by the county population of children under six years of age. White 
robust standard errors are clustered at the county level. NCANDS administrative records of 
alleged child maltreatment reports in the pre-treatment period collapsed to the county level. 
Covariates are included in all models (county-level unemployment rate, county-level poverty 
rate, child race, child age, family structure). All models include state fixed effects and month 
fixed effects. Trend = monthly time trend, treat = indicator for treated county. Standard errors in 
parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
 
Appendix 
Figure 1-A1: Plot of CPS reports by maltreatment type, biannual data 
 
Note: NCANDS administrative records of alleged child maltreatment reports 2010 – 2013 
collapsed to the county – six month period – maltreatment type – month level. Graph shows the 
total CPS reports per 100,000 children for each county subtype (those that expanded in 7/2011, 
























Alameda 6001 1,663,190 95.6% Jul-11  x 
Alpine 6003 1,120 28.6% Jan-12 x x 
Amador 6005 38,626 28.6% Jan-12 x x 
Butte 6007 229,294 28.6% Jan-12 x  
Calaveras 6009 45,670 28.6% Jan-12 x x 
Colusa 6011 21,805 28.6% Jan-12 x x 
Contra Costa 6013 1,147,439 35.7% Jul-11   
Del Norte 6015 27,470 28.6% Jan-12 x x 
El Dorado 6017 188,987 28.6% Jan-12 x  
Fresno 6019 989,255 . Jan-14   
Glenn 6021 28,094 28.6% Jan-12 x x 
Humboldt 6023 136,754 28.6% Jan-12 x  
Imperial 6025 182,830 28.6% Jan-12 x  
Inyo 6027 18,026 28.6% Jan-12 x x 
Kern 6029 893,119 11.0% Jul-11   
Kings 6031 150,101 28.6% Jan-12 x  
Lake 6033 64,246 28.6% Jan-12 x x 
Lassen 6035 31,163 28.6% Jan-12 x x 
Los Angeles 6037 10,163,507 33.5% Jul-11   
Madera 6039 156,890 28.6% Jan-12 x  
Marin 6041 260,955 28.6% Jan-12 x  
Mariposa 6043 17,569 28.6% Jan-12 x x 
Mendocino 6045 88,018 28.6% Jan-12 x  
Merced 6047 272,673 . Jan-14   
Modoc 6049 8,859 28.6% Jan-12 x x 
Mono 6051 14,168 28.6% Jan-12 x x 
Monterey 6053 437,907 . Mar-13   
Napa 6055 140,973 28.6% Jan-12 x x 
Nevada 6057 99,814 28.6% Jan-12 x  
Orange 6059 3,190,400 29.4% Jul-11   
Placer 6061 386,166 26.0% Aug-12   
Plumas 6063 18,742 28.6% Jan-12 x x 
Riverside 6065 2,423,266 16.9% Jan-12   
Sacramento 6067 1,530,615 3.7% Nov-12   




Bernardino 6071 2,157,404 20.4% Jan-12   
San Diego 6073 3,337,685 24.3% Jul-11   
San 
Francisco 6075 884,363 34.4% Jul-11   
San Joaquin 6077 745,424 4.4% Jun-12   
San Luis 
Obispo 6079 283,405 . Jan-14   
San Mateo 6081 771,410 41.3% Jul-11   
Santa 
Barbara 6083 448,150 . Jan-14   
Santa Clara 6085 1,938,153 29.2% Jul-11   
Santa Cruz 6087 275,897 14.3% Jan-12   
Shasta 6089 179,921 28.6% Jan-12 x  
Sierra 6091 2,999 28.6% Jan-12 x x 
Siskiyou 6093 43,853 28.6% Jan-12 x x 
Solano 6095 445,458 28.6% Jan-12 x  
Sonoma 6097 504,217 28.6% Jan-12 x  
Stanislaus  6099 547,899 . Jan-14   
Sutter 6101 96,648 28.6% Jan-12 x x 
Tehama 6103 63,926 28.6% Jan-12 x  
Trinity 6105 12,709 28.6% Jan-12 x x 
Tulare 6107 464,493 . Mar-13   
Tuolumne 6109 54,248 28.6% Jan-12 x x 
Ventura 6111 854,223 36.1% Jul-11   
Yolo 6113 219,116 28.6% Jan-12 x  
Yuba 6115 77,031 28.6% Jan-12 x   
 
Table 1-A2: DD estimation, subsample  
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 









A: Log(reports), with county-LTT         
Treat*Post -0.03 -0.11*** -0.01 -0.06 -0.02 -0.78*** 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.07) (0.09) 
r2 0.97 0.94 0.97 0.88 0.95 0.95 
N 33,073 31,284 32,691 26,123 10,583 8,643 
       
B: Log(reports), with county-LTT and in CA, excluding CMSP counties   
Treat*Post -0.02 -0.12*** 0.00 -0.05 0.01 -0.78*** 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.08) (0.09) 
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r2 0.97 0.94 0.97 0.89 0.95 0.95 
N 32,066 30,316 31,685 25,342 9,606 8,587 
  
Note: OLS models weighted by the county population of children under six years of age. White 
robust standard errors are clustered at the county level. NCANDS administrative records of 
alleged child maltreatment reports 2010 – 2013 collapsed to the county level (N = 4,755,579). 
Covariates are included in all models (county-level unemployment rate, county-level poverty 
rate, child race, child age, family structure). LTT = linear time trends. State and month fixed 
effects are included as well. Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Table 1-A3: DD estimation, biannual data using three county subtypes 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  All Abuse Neglect All Abuse Neglect 
Treat * Post -0.634* -0.129 -0.006 -0.640* -0.140* -0.009 
  (0.110) (0.035) (0.011) (0.102) (0.027) (0.016) 
Constant -8.991 6.594 7.742* -10.481 6.46 7.484* 
 (2.607) (1.611) (0.859) (3.790) (1.582) (0.959) 
r2 0.978 0.999 0.999 0.979 0.999 0.999 
N 192 144 144 192 144 144 
County type 
FE x x x x x x 
Biannual FE x x x x x x 
Month FE x x x x x x 
Controls x x x x x x 
County LTT x x x x x x 
County 
LTT2       x x x 
Note: OLS models weighted by the county subtype population of children under six years of age 
for each county subtype (those that expanded in 7/2011, those that did so in 1/2012, and the 
control counties).  Results are identical with and without clustering on county subtype. 
NCANDS administrative records of alleged child maltreatment reports 2010 – 2013 collapsed to 
the county subtype – six month period – maltreatment type – month level. Covariates are 
included in all models (county-level unemployment rate, county-level poverty rate, child race, 
child age, family structure). LTT = linear time trends. LTT2 = squared linear time trends. 






VII. Paper 2: ECEC Programs in the United States: Does Access Improve Child Safety?  
Abstract 
A growing body of literature contends that Early Childhood Education and Care (ECEC) 
programs should generally prioritize funding on the intensive margin on the basis that the 
adulthood human capital returns to quality are greater. Yet, little is known about the lower-bound 
benefits to ECEC programs that have the potential to counterbalance the push for quality. In 
other words, there may be an unmeasured value to expanding access over increasing quality for 
fewer children, unveiling a potential set of funding priorities for states looking to expand ECEC 
programming. Child maltreatment offers important insight into this question as it is a non-trivial 
metric of well-being that derives in part from time spent with children. Indeed, respite from 
children can not only increase labor market participation and education, it can plausibly increase 
the quality – and safety – of care as well. In this paper, I asses the role of ECEC program access 
and generosity on child maltreatment as measured by Child Protective Services (CPS) reports. 
Using county-year administrative data covering the census of CPS reports in the United States, I 
estimate the role of CCDF child care subsidies, Head Start/ Early Head Start, State pre-
kindergarten (SPK) and Universal pre-kindergarten (UPK) programs on CPS reports using OLS 
and multilevel models. In addition, I exploit exogenous variation in SPK enrollment surges to 
compare the CPS reports across states using a difference-in-difference-in-difference (DDD) 
framework. My results suggest that the largest welfare gains in program access may occur 
among the youngest children (under age three years), the group for whom program access is 
most constrained. However, findings from more robust, state-level models provide weak overall 





In the past 10 years, federal funding for Early Childhood Education and Care (ECEC) programs 
has increased by 62 percent.7 In the past two years alone, discretionary support for the Child 
Care and Development Block Grant has nearly doubled, with similar gains for Head Start and 
Early Head Start (HS/EHS) and state pre-kindergarten (SPK/UPK) programs, signifying a shift 
toward early childhood investments that dually benefit families. However, ECEC program 
access, funding, and the overall cost of care varies widely across states, resulting in disparate 
access for the most vulnerable children.  
Though prior work links high quality, holistic ECEC programs to parental educational and 
employment and children’s long-term health and human capital, a central question is whether 
policymakers should favor universal ECEC programs that are open to children of all 
socioeconomic backgrounds, or whether higher-quality programs targeted to a smaller 
population of more disadvantaged children are more beneficial. As low-income families rely on 
informal kinship and under-regulated care in the absence of a suitable substitute, ECEC 
programs have the potential to convey additional benefits in terms of respite from de facto care. 
Though extant literature links Head Start to a reduction in Child Protective Services (CPS) 
reports relative to children who remained at home, all other caregiving scenarios conveyed 
plausibly similar benefits (Zhai, Waldfogel, & Brooks-gunn, 2013). By extension, ECEC 





programs might plausibly yield similar effects on child maltreatment rates. Yet, little is known 
about the child safety benefits of ECEC generosity and access.  
This paper provides a first look at the cumulative role of ECEC programs on child maltreatment 
rates in the US. I answer two key questions. My first question asks whether trends in ECEC 
program availability track CPS reports. Using fixed effects and multilevel models (MLM), I first 
examine the relationship between ECEC program enrollment rates and administrative CPS 
reports to determine whether enrollment or program availability offsets the need for CPS 
services. I then employ a series of difference-in-difference-in-difference (DDD) models, 
comparing the CPS caseloads of states before and after a doubling in enrollment to those with 
stable enrollments. For my second question, I dig deeper into the relationship between SPK/UPK 
programs to understand the specific role of these programs in potentially offsetting CPS 
caseloads. Exploiting the cross-state variation in program availability type and eligibility date, I 
estimate event history models comparing children in states with SPK/UPK programs to those 
without leading up to and following the age-based eligibility cutoff dated eligibility cutoff date, 
making parallel comparisons across UPK/non-UPK states.  
My analysis makes several contributions to prior literature. First, my preferred, state-level 
models provide little evidence of a lower-bound effect of improved access on CPS report rates, 
implying that policymakers should push for improved program quality for the most 
disadvantaged children. Second, I advance the literature seeking to leverage existing policies to 
reduce and prevent child maltreatment. This is also the first study to combine detailed features of 
SPK and UPK programs. This paper proceeds as follows. Following a short description of child 
maltreatment and the three major ECEC programs with which this study is concerned, I discus 
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the datasets used in my analysis, followed by my empirical methodology and results. My 
discussion of potential mechanisms and conclusion follows.  
Background: child maltreatment 
Child maltreatment is a metric of impoverishment, stress, and household and relationship 
instability (Doyle & Aizer, 2018).  
Child maltreatment reports have increased by 12.2 to 18.8 percent since 20138 with disparities 
concentrated in high poverty geographies with relatively thin labor markets and conservative 
social safety nets (U.S. Department of Health & Human Services Families et al., 2016), there is a 
strong, theoretical argument for prevention. Child maltreatment has been linked to negative 
consequences for young children throughout adulthood (see e.g. Berger & Waldfogel, 2011; 
Doyle & Aizer, 2018). Adults who were maltreated as children have compromised mental health 
and stability, employment, earnings, and other measures of human capital and well-being (Currie 
& Tekin, 2012; Currie & Widom, 2010b; Fry et al., 2018; J. P. Mersky & Topitzes, 2010; Perez 
& Widom, 1994). Though causal studies of this nature are rare, observational and cohort studies 
agree with the burgeoning human capital production literature that early childhood is the most 
promising window for intervention (Almond & Currie, 2011; Almond et al., 2017; Currie & 
Rossin-Slater, 2015; Heckman & Masterov, 2007). Young children in particular face higher risks 
of maltreatment, with children under six representing half of all victims in the US.  
                                                 
 




Zeroing in on at-risk children is particularly difficult as young children spend less time in front 
of mandated reporters than do school-age children, and young families are relatively 
disconnected to public assistance (Pac, Nam, Waldfogel, & Wimer, 2017). As a result, US child 
maltreatment prevention policies target young, low-income families who are known to CPS 
agencies, while the swaths of children unknown to CPS – many who plausibly face much higher 
risks – remain unknown to officials, receiving post-crisis interventions rather than prevention. 
Alternative strategies aim to reduce the overall risk of child maltreatment by expanding access to 
and generosity of the social safety net. Numerous studies have linked increases in income via 
cash and credit benefits and minimum wages to reduced CPS caseloads, suggesting that stress 
and income are primary conduits for maltreatment (Berger et al., 2016; Cancian et al., 2013; 
Paxson & Waldfogel, 1999a, 2002, 2003b; Raissian & Bullinger, 2017; Wildeman & Fallesen, 
2017). Stable employment appears integral to the child maltreatment equation as well, 
differentially so among men, especially in high-unemployment areas with a male-heavy 
workforce (Lindo, Schaller, & Hansen, 2018).  
Policy Landscape 
Though not all ECEC programs are endowed with the same set of aims, their overlapping 
populations and services result in a set of choices that are close suitable substitutes, especially 
among children age three and four years, who are eligible for all three programs.  
Head Start/Early Head Start (HS/EHS) and the Child Care and Development Fund child care 
subsidy program (CCDF) are the two largest federally sponsored ECEC programs that provide 
care, preschool, and services for young children and their families. State pre-kindergarten (SPK) 
programs are state-run preschools for three- and four-year old children, operating using a blend 
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of state, local, and federal funding. Unlike SPK programs that are generally means-tested or 
require some other proof of hardship for eligibility, universal pre-kindergarten (UPK) programs 
are a subset of SPK programs, opening seats to all families regardless of income and hardship.  
Though CCDF is the largest funded program in terms of childcare services for children from 
birth to age 13, only 15 percent of eligible families receive subsidies. Bipartisan support for 
childcare has boosted funding for CCDF in recent years, most recently an additional $5.8 Billion 
for the CCDBG in 2018, in part to boost the stipend amounts such that the net cost to families is 
much lower and to increase the number of certified providers (Child Care Aware of America, 
2018). For instance, a number of states have seen declines in childcare slots in recent years, 
ranging from five percent in Minnesota and Wisconsin to 9 percent in California. CCDF 
subsidies are remitted to a range of providers including informal kinship care (relatives, 
neighbors) and certified child care centers. Some states have relationships with CPS agencies 
such that CPS-involved families receive priority placements when a waitlist is in place. Prior 
work found that states with stalled enrollments on account of a waitlist were predictive of 
increased CPS rates, though the precise relationship between program enrollment and 
maltreatment has yet to be established (Klevens, Barnett, Florence, & Moore, 2015).  
HS/EHS has a much broader reach than CCDF, serving up to 31 percent of eligible children age 
three to five years (HS, 7 percent for EHS).9 In addition to providing high-quality care and 
education, HS/EHS conveys a wealth of health and parenting benefits to parents including 





parental training on developmentally appropriate discipline and care, health education and health 
services referrals, job training, with special services for children with disabilities, in foster care, 
and those with temporary or permanent homelessness. Unlike the other programs, HS/EHS have 
direct relationships with CPS agencies such that referrals are commonly made in both directions. 
For this reason, parsing out causality for these programs is more difficult, with more credible 
findings coming from individual-level randomized studies (see e.g. Zhai, Waldfogel, & Brooks-
Gunn, 2013).   
SPK and UPK programs served 1.5 Million children over the 2016-2017 school year, enrolling 
33 percent of eligible children.10 Though the number of states without SPK programs has fallen 
by half since 2002, states have experimented with changes in funding and program availability 
such that access is highly variable across states and time. Though gross funding has increased in 
most states, five have seen decreases in funding and the average per-child spend has declined to 
$5,008 on average. The most notable surge in funding came in 2014 through the Preschool 
Development Grants (PDG) afforded to 18 states (in 2016/2017) as part of President Obama’s 
“Preschool for All” initiative. Though only 40 percent of PDF funding is dedicated to SPK/UPK 
programs, these funds are generally used to boost the number of seats, program quality, and for 
extended day programming.  
 
 





Prior Literature  
There is an extensive literature examining the role of ECEC programs in promoting rich 
childhood environments for low-income children. In general , the benefits of ECEC programs for 
young children are fairly well-established; there is ample evidence that high-quality, accessible 
programs enrich the lives of young children, impacting their short-term cognitive and non-
cognitive ability and their human capital production through adulthood (Currie & Rossin-Slater, 
2015; Gormley, Gayer, Phillips, & Dawson, 2005; Love et al., 2005; Magnuson, Meyers, Ruhm, 
& Waldfogel, 2004). However, these positive findings are not universal across all ECEC 
programs and are mixed for child care subsidies in particular; historically low levels of support 
and strict subsidy maintenance policies have been attributed to poorer child-level outcomes due 
to subsidy instability and lower overall quality of care (see e.g. Henly et al. 2017; Herbst and 
Tekin 2016; Forry, Daneri, and Howarth 2013). 
ECEC programs convey benefits to parents as well. A smaller subset of studies focus on the role 
of ECEC programs on maternal labor force participation and human capital production. 
Although the results are somewhat mixed, CCDF child care subsidies and State Pre-K programs 
have been linked to improved maternal employment (Bainbridge, Meyers, & Waldfogel, 2003; 
Bettendorf, Jongen, & Muller, 2015; Blau & Tekin, 2007; Geyer, Haan, & Wrohlich, 2014; 
Givord & Marbot, 2014; Ha & Miller, 2015; Nollenberger & Rodríguez-Planas, 2013), however 
the effects of Head Start on employment are less conclusive (Sabol & Chase-Lansdale, 2015). 
Head Start and child care subsidies appear to spur additional education among receiving parents 
(Herbst & Tekin, 2011; Sabol & Chase-Lansdale, 2015).  In addition to improved labor market 
participation, more generous ECEC programs might increase disposable income and reduce 
financial and parenting stressors, and effectively decrease the hours that a child is exposed to a 
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potentially unsafe situation. For instance, adequate supervision has been linked to a reduction in 
injuries and child fatalities (Damashek & Corlis, 2017; Damashek, Nelson, & Bonner, 2013). 
Head Start and child care subsidies have been linked with improved maternal mental health and 
gentle parenting practices (Herbst and Tekin 2014; Love et al. 2005; Zhai, Waldfogel, and 
Brooks-Gunn 2013), although positive effects were not a universal finding (Ansari, Purtell, & 
Gershoff, 2016). A reduction in child maltreatment would naturally flow from this set of 
benefits.  
A handful of causal studies found reduced maltreatment rates (by up to 50 percent) and out of 
home placement (foster care) among children enrolled in HS/EHS (Green et al., 2014; Klein, 
Fries, & Emmons, 2017; Zhai et al., 2013), and other public preschool programs, such as 
Chicago’s Child-Parent Centers (J. Mersky, Topitzes, & Reynolds, 2011; Reynolds & Robertson, 
2003). Observational studies found similar effects, however the results were mixed and generally 
unable to explore specific mechanisms. The majority of the studies exploring the maltreatment 
consequences of ECEC program involvement suffer from low power to detect CPS involvement. 
Additionally, few studies attempt to examine the mechanisms that contribute to a reduction in 
maltreatment, hampering the tuning and expanding of policies to further benefit vulnerable 
children. Furthermore, few of these studies detail the care received by children in the control 
group. Defining the forms of care being given to children in the control group is important, as 
many children are not receiving the counterfactual of ‘no care’ and instead, are faced with a large 
number of close, suitable substitutes (Kline & Walters, 2016). Within the taxonomy of ‘other 
preschool’ programs, there exists a wide variation in quality – even at the same price point – so if 
‘other preschool’ is analyzed as a single homogeneous treatment, then implicitly, there are no 
assumed differences between a $40,000 private school and a state Pre-K program. Finally, none 
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of those surveyed explored the maltreatment reducing effects of state Pre-K programs and CCDF 
child care subsidies. 
Data 
I combine several unique data sources to assess the role of ECEC programs in mitigating child 
maltreatment. I will discuss each in turn.  
Data on child maltreatment comes from the National Child Abuse and Neglect Data System 
(NCANDS) Child File, a federally sponsored administrative data from 2000 to 2017 capturing 
the census of CPS reports for all states who voluntarily submitted data in this period, ranging 
from 20 states in 2000, 45 states in 2003, to all states in 2017. Each observation represents a 
report for a single child, such that children can appear multiple times in the data if they receive 
more than one CPS report within or across years. County identifiers are supplied in the restricted 
data for all cases with more than 1,000 reports per year, leaving a fraction of cases omitted from 
county-level analysis. As data are voluntarily suppled from state-level reporting systems with 
varying internal collection requirements, the availability of a number of variables is inconsistent 
across all states and years. For this reason, I restrict my analysis to the key measures of 
maltreatment (overall CPS report rate and that by major maltreatment type, substantiation rate, 
and removal / foster care rate), along with key demographic indicators (child race/ethnicity, age, 
sex, family structure) and mandated reporter type. Child maltreatment is measured by the natural 
log of the number of reports per county-year, though I include the report rate per 100,000 
children. The residuals using the latter measure fail to follow a normal distribution, so include 
these in my primary estimates only for comparability to prior literature. To ease interpretation, I 
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characterize measures of ECEC program availability similarly, as the log of enrollment and the 
rate of children served per 100,000 children in the county.  
My second data set covers SPK/UPK enrollment, funding, and program characteristics. I scraped 
these data from NIEER State of Preschool Yearbooks from 2003 – 2017. NIEER conducts an 
annual survey of SPK/UPK programs to quantify the number and percentage of children served 
by the 60 programs in 43 states (Idaho, Montana, New Hampshire, North Dakota, South Dakota, 
Utah and Wyoming do not currently have SPK/UPK programs), program features, and quality 
metrics for benchmarking gains (or losses). These data are merged to the NCANDS data at the 
state-year level. 
My third data set captures HS/EHS enrollment by child age at the state-year level from Head 
Start’s PIR administrative reporting data and Kids Count Data Center, and my fourth captures 
CCDF subsidy use and family, provider, and reimbursement statistics at the state-year level from 
AHS administrative CCDF reports. Both of these data are merged to NCANDS at the state-year 
level.  
I use SEER for US population data by age at the county-year level for population levels, and 
draw state-year level controls from the University of Kentucky Center for Poverty Research 
(UKCPR), including the net effective minimum wage, state per capita income, unemployment 
rate, and benefit usage and generosity statistics. Finally, my seventh data come from the CCDF 
policy database, which captures state-level variation in CCDF policies - I extract state-year level 
information on policies relating to stipend availability and availability.  
For my first question, I aggregate these data to a panel of county-year level observations, 
merging all extramural data sets using the state-year variables. As SPK/UPK programs operate 
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during the school year, I merge these variables using the school year calendar (August – June) 
rather than the calendar year. For my second question, I use the same data aggregated to the 
county-month level, to estimate changes in CPS report rates in the months leading up to and 
following an SPK/UPK introduction or expansion.  
As the rate of substantiation and rate of removal from foster care reflect county and state-level 
norms, population characteristics, differing definitions in maltreatment, and varying degrees of 
prevention program generosity, these measures are typically considered laden with measurement 
error relative to the ‘true’ rate of child maltreatment. The CPS report rate is conceived as the 
least biased measure of child safety, though use of this measure necessitates a number of caveats 
as well. Though it would seem straightforward to interpret a decline in CPS reports as a decline 
in the ‘true’ child maltreatment rate, the opposite could be true as well. If a policy or intervention 
results in an increase in CPS reports, it could be that there is no change in the relative safety of 
the children, but instead a shift in the willingness of mandated or non-mandated reporters to 
generate a report. Thankfully, this is a fully testable assertion in this study, where the nature of 
the caller is known.  
Empirical methodology 
I exploit variation in the timing and generosity of ECEC programs across states to estimate the 
effect on of program enrollment on CPS reports. For my first question, I employ county-year and 
state-year panel models using fixed effects with robust standard errors clustered at the state level. 
Though I present results for both estimations, those at the state-year level are subject to less bias 
and are therefore preferred. For the county-level models, I estimate the following:  




Where y is the outcome for children in county 𝑐 in year 𝑡, 𝐶 is a county fixed effect, 𝑇 is a year 
fixed effect, 𝑋 is vector of macroeconomic controls, 𝐸𝐶𝐸𝐶 captures the program enrollment.11  
𝜀𝑐𝑡 is a random error term, capturing the unobserved factors and characteristics that predict CPS 
report rates such as mandatory reporting policies, child maltreatment fatalities, and relative ease 
of reporting. All models are estimated using OLS weighted by the county population of children 
younger than six years.12 In addition to the inclusion of the common macroeconomic controls 
(maternal unemployment rates, per capita income, and effective minimum wage), I include the 
state EITC rates, along with demographic composition including race/ethnicity, age, and family 
structure. I include county and year fixed effects to control for secular differences in CPS 
reporting rates across counties and over time.  
To the extent that the error term is uncorrelated with ECEC, the unbiased estimated effect of 
ECEC programs is captured by 𝛿.  However, there are several reasons why unbiasedness may be 
an implausible. For instance, more child-centric states may be prone to SPK/UPK programs and 
to funding child maltreatment prevention programs. In this case, δ captures the effect of state 
generosity as well as that of ECEC programs. I deal with this in two ways; first, I test the 
robustness of my results to the inclusion of county-specific linear time trends to account for 
unobserved factors that vary within counties over time. Under the condition that unobserved 
factors across counties exhibit a monotonic trend, these models should fully account for any 
                                                 
 
11 As the income eligibility standards for two programs differ by state (State pre-K and CCDF subsidies), this choice 
captures eligibility differences across states as well, so an alternative specification includes the fraction enrolled out 
of the state population of children who are only age-eligible as a broader measure of generosity, including income 
eligibility thresholds as a separate variable.  
12 Age-stratified models use the age-appropriate weights 
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remaining bias. The key identifying assumption is that treatment (enrollment) rates are uniform 
across counties. Though not untenable, it is more likely that counties with more concentrated 
poverty will have higher program enrollment rates than their more advantaged peer counties, 
implying that my estimates are relatively conservative.  
Though this approach addresses concerns with omitted variables, reverse causality might 
threaten the validity of my results. If ECEC program expansions increase the number of seats to 
families who would otherwise have kept their children at home, childcare providers might be 
more likely to report at-risk children to CPS. Childcare providers are mandated reporters in 48 
states and DC, meaning that failure to report could result in criminal prosecution.  If reverse 
causality is indeed driving ECEC effects, the ensuing bias would inflate my estimated effects, 
biasing my hypothesized negative effects away from zero. However, the degree of bias is 
unlikely in a fixed effect framework, where the remaining variation in CPS report rates, after the 
inclusion of controls and fixed effects, is likely random. Nevertheless, to account for this 
potential threat, I run the same models stratified by the type of reporter notated on the CPS 
report, either childcare / educational or not, ruling out or rendering support to the reverse 
causality problem. 
 While the fixed effect framework is commonplace in the micro econometric toolkit, the 
underlying empirical assumption in equations (1) and (2) is that the residuals on the state-level 
are not correlated with county-level residuals in any meaningful way. Though this assumption 
may be tenable in some applications, true dependence between and within geographies over time 
implies that any non-random correlation would bias fixed effects estimates (omitted variable 
bias). The Hausman test can be informative in answering the fixed vs. random effect question, 
though the test is uninformative in deciding between mixed effects and fixed or random effects. 
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That the test fails to reject the null (in favor of fixed effects) does not mean that intuition is 
ignorable.  If we truly believe that the between effect of states on county-level CPS reports is 
negligible, then equation (1) is feasible. Alternatively, if we believe that the state-level effect is 
not static, then the relationship between and within counties and states must be incorporated into 
the estimation. Indeed, likelihood ratio tests confirms that random slopes should be included, 
relative to the random intercept-only model. For this reason, I employ multilevel models (mixed 
effects models, referred to henceforth as MLM) in addition to the conventional fixed effects 
framework for my primary models.  This framework incorporates two random terms - a random 
intercept and slope at the state level, allowing heterogeneity in the within-effect across states. 
These effects follow a Normal distribution. This formulation more fully accounts for differences 
across counties and states over time, information that is effectively ‘thrown away’ in the fixed 
effect framework. I include state-level means of the predictors of interest to account for group- 
and predictor- level correlation (Bafumi & Gelman, 2006). These models are estimated using 
Maximum Likelihood Estimation.  
For my second question, I ask whether SPK/UPK programs in particular offset child 
maltreatment as measured by CPS reports. To do so, I use two parallel two approaches. First, I 
employ a series of difference-in-difference-difference (DDD) estimations that capture the effect 
of large, state-specific shocks for SPK/ UPK programs that boosted enrollment by over 50 
percent, comparing eligible children to those who are ineligible (on the basis of age in months). I 
compare UPK programs separately from SPK programs. DDD models are characterized by 
equation (2) below, where Post is coded as “1” for states that experienced a large discontinuous 
shock and “0” otherwise, with eligibility denoting four year old children apart from those who 
are ineligible (younger than three and five years, omitting three year old children entirely): 
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(2) 𝑦𝑐𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽 𝐶𝑐 + 𝜌𝑇𝑡 +  𝛾𝑋𝑐𝑡 +  𝜋𝐸𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑐𝑡 +  𝜃𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑠𝑡 ∗ 𝐸𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑐𝑡 +  𝜀𝑐𝑡 
 
I estimate equation (2) as a separate OLS model for each program using the same weighting and 
clustering strategies defined above. Unlike standard difference-in-difference models, DDD 
models allow for a weaker set of assumptions. In particular, a test of common trends in the 
outcome variables in the DD context reveals that the parallel trend assumption is indeed, 
untenable (see appendix figure 2-A1). DDD models compare the outcomes across program 
availability and eligibility, formulating an Intent-to-Treat (ITT) effect that is interpreted as 
relative.  
Second, I ask whether children’s relative likelihood of maltreatment declines upon gaining 
eligibility for SPK and UPK programs. This serves as more precise test for causality, either 
ruling or confirming that program effects occur only among age-eligible children. Using county-
month data where I observe the child’s age in months, I employ an event history model 
extrapolating eligibility for SPK/UPK programs in a given month based on the match between 
their age in months relative to the program’s cutoff date. I construct a series of leads and lags 
before and after the cutoff date for a 6 month bandwidth to ensure that that the program does not 
coincide with other programmatic changes throughout the school year. I estimate the following 
model using both OLS and MLM as characterized in equation (3) below: 
(3) 𝑦𝑐𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽 𝐶𝑐 + 𝜌𝑇𝑡 +  𝛾𝑋𝑐𝑡 + ∑ 𝜃𝑗𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑠𝑡
𝑗




 is a series of dummy variables equal to 1 for the states in which UPK was in 
place for 𝑗 periods, 𝐽 ={-6, -5, -4, -3, -2, -1, 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} with the month of the eligibility 
start as the omitted category (0). I estimate these models for all SPK/UPK programs combined, 
then separately for UPK programs only. I include county-specific linear time trends in the results 




My sample follows the expected distributions of maltreatment type, child age, and race/ethnicity, 
as seen in the summary statistics reported in table 2-1. The major maltreatment type is neglect 
(61.2 percent), with physical abuse reaching only 17 percent of reports. The majority of children 
are under the age of 12 months (20.4 percent).  
In the following section, I present the results from county-level models. Following, I present my 
preferred set of more robust, state-level models.  
County-level results are presented in table 2-2. Each coefficient represents an individual 
regression, with OLS regressions in panel A, and multilevel models in panel B. As the residuals 
on the CPS report rate/100,000 are not normally distributed (columns 4 through 6), I rely on the 
log of CPS reports for the remainder of the paper. This sample includes all children under age six 
whose CPS reports are collapsed to the county-year level, with the demographic and macro 
controls discussed above. Across the two outcomes, the direction and magnitude of effects is not 
consistent, though there are some patterns of note. In the OLS models, CCDF enrollment has a 
mostly negative effect, meaning that an increase in CCDF enrollment is associated with a decline 
in CPS reports up to a magnitude of 32 percent for physical abuse (column 2, panel A).  These 
findings generally track the multilevel models (panel B), though the MLM coefficients are more 
precisely estimated. The very large magnitude in the effects of CCDF enrollment is concerning, 
motivating several robustness checks in the following section using state-aggregated data.  
If ECEC program enrollment is indeed driving these effects, then the programs should be more 
or less effective for subgroups of the population. I focus on two subgroups in particular, for 
whom the effects of ECEC program availability may be more salient. First, I estimate the same 
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models on a subset of the sample that includes only three and four-year old children as these 
children are generally eligible for all three programs. These findings, presented in table 2-3, 
follow the same general pattern, though magnitudes are relatively smaller and are more 
consistently negative for all programs with the exception of SPK/UPK programs (row 1, table 2-
3, panel A). SPK is associated with a 2 percent increase in all reports (panel B, column 1), but a 
3 percent decline in abuse reports and a 12 percent increase in neglect reports (columns 2 and 3). 
Conversely, CCDF enrollment is uniformly associated with a decline in all reports and the two 
subtypes – up to 37 percent – while HS/EHS is associated with a decline only in all reports 
(column 1). Note that the magnitudes for both estimations (tables 2-2 and 2-3) are somewhat 
smaller when county-specific linear time trends are included (appendix table 2-A2).  
Second, I stratify by a proxy for socioeconomic status using an indicator for whether the child’s 
caregiver at the time of the CPS report answered “yes” to the question “are you currently on any 
form of public assistance?” The group without public assistance, shown in columns 1 – 3 of table 
2-4, show generally smaller coefficients that follow the same magnitudes with the exception of 
total program enrollment. The group with public assistance appear to be most affected by CCDF 
subsidy availability, though the magnitudes are smaller for abuse (column 5 vs 3) in the 
multilevel models (panel B) and equal for the fixed effects models (panel A, columns 5 and 3). 
The SPK coefficients are positive for both specifications and significant for all and neglect 
reports in the MLM context (panel B), implying that SPK program availability may indeed boost 
reports. This could be due to what is often referred to the ‘visibility effect’, where an increase in 
reporting is due to the reporting behavior of SPK teachers and administrators rather than an 
actual change in maltreatment rates. As I discuss in the following section, I find no evidence of 
differential reporting by child care/educational reports and those who are not, suggesting then 
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that these effects may be anomalous, or simply biased by measurement error. Individual level 
data with actual ECEC program enrollment would better inform this question.  
In table 2-5, I focus on CCDF and HS/EHS availability for children younger than three. As 
caregiving slots are the most competitive – and the most expensive – for children in this age 
group, enrollment increases might directly reduce the caregiving burden for young children 
exclusively. These results suggest that CCDF subsidies appear to be effective in reducing CPS 
report rates among all children younger than three years, especially reports of neglect (column 
3). For children younger than 12 months, both programs appear to reduce abuse reports, though 
again, the magnitudes are relatively large. Though these results are not causal, they suggest that 
future research should examine this relationship more closely using experimental or quasi-
experimental methods.  
The results presented up to this point are correlational. Though I attempt to address reverse 
causality in the following section, other threats to causality – namely, omitted variable bias – 
deem these effects observational in nature. Difference-in-difference models would be a natural 
approach, though are biased in this case on account of differing pre-trends in CPS reports (see 
figure 2-A1). To estimate a more plausibly causal effect of program enrollment on CPS reports, I 
estimate DDD models to compare the CPS report rates across eligible and ineligible children in 
states with a surge in SPK/UPK program enrollment,13 compared to those without. I present 
these findings in table 2-6 with fixed effect (OLS) models shown in panel A, and MLM shown in 
                                                 
 




panel B. I code four year old children as eligible, omit three year old children whose eligibility 
varies, and include all others (younger than age six) as ineligible. I find that a jump in enrollment 
of at least 50 percent is associated with a 2 to 4 percent decline in all reports (column 1, panels A 
and B). Though the main effects are mixed, that the interaction is mostly null and insignificant in 
the MLM context (panel B) suggests that these programs fail to credibly offset CPS involvement. 
I next examine two features of SPK programs to test whether specific policy levers are important 
in offsetting CPS report rates.  
SPK programs generally enroll children based on expressed and demonstrated need, whereas 
UPK programs are indeed universal, meaning that there are no requirements for enrollment other 
than age-based eligibility. UPK programs offer similar programming, and like SPK programs, 
often blend funding from multiple sources to better serve children’s particular needs. If SPK 
programs in general fail to affect CPS report rates, it could be that this is because they’re catering 
to a population of children for whom the risk of maltreatment is already observed and 
established. Alternatively, UPK programs are open to all – regardless of CPS involvement or 
poverty status – so may reasonably offset CPS report rates among children with unobserved risk. 
I therefore estimate equation (2) using enrollment jumps in UPK programs exclusively. These 
results, shown in table 2-7, suggest that jumps in UPK enrollment are positively associated with 
abuse reports (column 2). Ecological fallacy plagues these estimations, as I am unable to observe 
whether children use SPK or UPK. Therefore, I now examine this relationship more closely in an 
event history model.  
One key eligibility requirement for SPK/UPK programs is that children meet a minimum age 
requirement. I collapse county-year level data to children’s age-in-months to test whether 
gaining eligibility affects CPS reporting rates across maltreatment type. This event history 
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approach focuses on children living in states with any SPK program (figure 2-1) and any UPK 
program (figure 2-2). Comparing across children in age-eligible and ineligible groups, there are 
no consistent differences in maltreatment rates in the post-eligibility period. MLM models using 
the same approach yield the same patterns estimated with slightly greater precision (that for SPK 
programs is shown in figure 2-A2 in the appendix). These offer the strongest evidence yet that 
SPK and UPK programs fail to offer a lower-bound benefit to four-year old children. These 
results are not surprising as typical programs run for 2-4 hours per day.  
Several SPK/UPK programs contract with local, CCDF subsidy, and HS/EHS providers to 
extend the school day beyond the half- or school-day schedule. I test the salience of this program 
feature using a DDD model. The results, shown in table 2-8, show small, insignificant effects, 
implying that SPK/UPK program generosity in terms of hours per day is ignorable to CPS rates.  
Robustness Checks 
Though a subset of these findings imply a negative correlation between program enrollments and 
CPS reports, there are some positive effects that cannot be ignored. In particular, SPK programs 
and HS/EHS appear to have a positive effect on neglect, suggestive of either a spike in reporting 
or maltreatment from these caregivers themselves. To test this, I estimate the same models on 
two subsets of children – those whose reports were generated from child care or education-based 
mandated reporters and all others. I regress the same models on both subgroups, as shown in 
table 2-9. I find that the patterns for both non-Child care reporters (columns 1 – 3) and child care 
reporters (columns 5 – 8) are similar with the exception of HS/EHS, which changes direction 
from negative to positive (columns 3 and 6, both panels). This suggests that the effects I detect 
are not an artifact of reverse causality (the coefficients would have all been positive if this were 
the case).  
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One problem with using CPS report rates as a measure is that it imperfectly captures actual child 
maltreatment. Measures of substantiation and removal from the home are biased as outcomes, as 
there are vast differences in defining (and punishing) maltreatment across states. Still, 
differential effects in these outcomes could point to differences in maltreating behavior, as 
opposed to reporting. In table 2-A1 in the appendix, I show the results from estimating equation 
1 on the rate of removals into foster care (columns 1 and 3) and the rate of substantiated reports 
for each of three ECEC programs. I detect decreases in the removal rate for nearly all outcomes, 
with small insignificant increases in substantiation for all except for CCDF (columns 2 and 4), 
for whom the effects are negative and marginally significant. These findings imply that if CCDF 
is indeed responsible for the negative effects I detect earlier, it could be because access to this 
program alters parental behavior. In other words, in the absence of CCDF, parents might be more 
likely to maltreat their children.  
There are a number of differences in ECEC program implementation across states, many of 
which are exogenously implemented, allowing for a causal test of potential mechanisms. If 
respite is indeed, the primary pathway through which ECEC program access improves child 
maltreatment rates, policy changes affecting the underlying mechanisms such as stress and 
income should have indistinguishable effects. I expect ECEC programs to reduce maltreatment 
reports through four potential pathways; (1) increase in disposable income and a reduction in 
financial hardship (2) increased parental labor market participation (3) a relatively safe 
caregiving scenario with increased supervision by outside observers and (4) a reduction in 
parental stress due to the child being partially out of the home and due to being exposed to other 
strategies for discipline.  
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The results from SPK-specific estimations above suggest either that these programs are too small 
in scale to reasonably affect children and families at risk of CPS involvement, or that parent’s 
time, income, and stress – the pathways through which SPK programs might reduce 
maltreatment – remains largely unaffected. Yet, there are two features of CCDF subsidy 
programs that may offer additional insight into these potential mechanisms.  
Unlike SPK and HS/EHS, CCDF child care subsidies require caregivers to remit a copay to 
providers that varies by state which could also directly affect the amount of disposable income 
offset by the program. States with higher copayments can be compared to those with lower 
copayments at similar income eligibility thresholds, allowing for a direct test on the effect of an 
increase in disposable income on child abuse and neglect, presumably having the largest effect 
on neglect. The key assumption is that parents in states with higher copays receive the same 
amount of care, presumably using other sources of care to offset the gap at the same rate as 
parents with lower copay amounts. Similarly, states with lower income eligibility thresholds 
restrict program access to only the most impoverished, reducing overall access and increasing 
child care costs. Both of these program features are exogenously implemented and change from 
year-to-year, such that a regression of these policy features on CPS report rates may reveal 
income to be a potential mechanism. The results from estimating equation (1) using these policy 
features (table 2-A7 in the appendix) suggest that while income eligibility is likely not to affect 
CPS rates, states with lower copay amounts have .05 – 1.1 percent fewer abuse reports (column 
5).  
One way to reconcile the differences in results across specifications in my primary results is to 
aggregate the data to a higher-level, such that the need for county-level fixed effects, time trends, 
and the MLM are eliminated. Further, this approach addresses any concern about the assumption 
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that county-level ECEC enrollment rates are uniform across counties. In tables 2-A4 – A6 in the 
appendix, I replicate my primary results using data collapsed to the state x age x race/ethnicity x 
reporter x maltreatment type. These results (shown exclusively with state and year fixed effects 
and state-specific linear time trends) yield a noticeably different pattern. For instance, table 2-A4 
shows the results from estimating ECEC program enrollment on each of three samples – all 
children under age six (panel A), preschoolers (panel B) and children younger than 3 (panel C). 
SPK has a positive effect on all and neglect reports in all three samples (columns 1 and 3) which 
is consistent with earlier results. The effects of CCDF are negative for neglect reports, but 
insignificant, and positive for other outcomes. If the effect I detected earlier for young children 
were indeed ‘true,’ one would expect this effect to be perhaps smaller in magnitude, not larger 
and insignificant. That SPK affects younger, ineligible children also serves as a sort of 
falsification test, suggesting that either I am detecting spillover effects from older siblings, or 
that my earlier results should be interpreted with great caution. I also implement the DDD 
models (table 2-A5) to find fairly similar results, though the main effects differ in terms of 
direction and magnitude, and the interactions are generally much smaller and insignificant.  
Conclusion 
In this study, I estimate whether ECEC program enrollment reduces CPS caseloads, a measure of 
child maltreatment and safety. Though I find limited evidence that CCDF programs offset CPS 
reports for children younger than three, my preferred state-level results yield null results, 
suggesting that county-level findings should be interpreted with caution. For states looking to 
expand ECEC program offerings, the results from this study concur with prior evidence that state 
and local ECEC funding should indeed focus on program quality, as access alone appears to have 
little effect on CPS report rates. I find no evidence of reductions in reports from other programs, 
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suggesting that either the programs themselves do not reach the population at risk of CPS 
reports, or that the program offerings alone are inadequate to affect child safety. 
The primary limitation to this study is that ECEC uptake is unobservable at the individual level, 
so the results are interpreted as state-level effects of ECEC availability and generosity on child 
maltreatment reports. Second, I am unable to detect spillover that might occur within families 
and households. If care provided for one child enables parents to pay for care of other children is 
impossible to see in these data, as I am unable to link children within families. 
Figures 
Figure 2-1: Event History (OLS) effect of SPK program availability 
 
 
Note: This figure shows the coefficients and confidence intervals for event history regressions 
estimated using OLS on county-month aggregated data. Ineligible children – those younger than 
three years and age five years – are shown on the left, and eligible children – age four years – are 
shown on the right. Three year old children are omitted entirely due to their varying eligibility. 







Figure 2-2: Event History (OLS) effect of UPK program availability 
 
Note: This figure shows the coefficients and confidence intervals for event history regressions 
estimated using OLS on county-month aggregated data. Ineligible children – those younger than 
three years and age five years – are shown on the left, and eligible children – age four years – are 
shown on the right. Three year old children are omitted entirely due to their varying eligibility. 
All models include demographic and macro level controls.  
 
Tables  
Table 2-1: Summary statistics 
Variable mean/freq. 
Alleged Maltreatment 
type   
Physical Abuse 17.1% 
Neglect 61.2% 
Sexual Abuse 4.0% 
Psychological  3.4% 
Other 5.3% 
No Maltreatment 9.1% 
  






Child age   
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Infant (< 12 months) 20.4% 
1 year 15.4% 
2 years 15.7% 
3 years 15.8% 
4 years 16.0% 




Table 2-2: Effect of ECEC program enrollment on maltreatment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Log(CPS reports) CPS Report Rate / 100,000 children 
  All  Abuse Neglect All  Abuse Neglect 
Panel A: Fixed Effects         
SPK 0.02 0.07 0.12 32.07 -19.40 54.28* 
 (0.02) (0.08) (0.07) (28.79) (11.54) (26.66) 
CCDF -0.08 -0.32 -0.20 -50.50 -7.74 -220.85 
 (0.09) (0.29) (0.19) (136.54) (33.44) (143.08) 
HS/EHS -0.22 0.04 0.00 682.82 260.54 656.41 
 (0.15) (0.59) (0.46) (361.63) (169.77) (344.79) 
Panel B: Multilevel models         
SPK 0.034* 0.02 0.12*** 170.96*** 11.58* 143.82*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (13.38) (4.81) (12.91) 
CCDF 0.045 -0.39*** -0.35*** 138.01*** 80.34*** 29.49 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (30.78) (7.20) (21.79) 
HS/EHS -0.321* 0.27 0.32* 1173.88*** 291.85*** 928.27*** 
  (0.13) (0.14) (0.14) (81.40) (14.86) (45.60) 
N 9,479 9,403 9,448 9,479 9,403 9,448 
 
Note: Panel A shows OLS regressions weighted by the county population of children under age 
six. Panel B shows multilevel models with random intercepts and slopes for counties nested in 
states. Enrollment for log outcomes, enrollment is measured in logs, and for rate outcomes, 
enrollment is similarly measured as rates per 100,000 children. County-year level aggregated 









Table 2-3: Effect of ECEC program enrollment on maltreatment, 3- and 4- year old children 
 (1) (2) (3) 
  All  Abuse Neglect 
Panel A: Fixed Effects   
SPK 0.03 0.04 0.14 
 (0.02) (0.08) (0.08) 
CCDF -0.05 -0.16 -0.23 
 (0.08) (0.22) (0.23) 
HS/EHS -0.26 -0.18 -0.04 
 (0.14) (0.39) (0.47) 
Panel B: Multilevel models   
SPK 0.02* -0.03** 0.12*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
CCDF -0.1*** -0.18*** -0.37*** 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) 
HS/EHS -0.31*** -0.02 0.11 
  (0.07) (0.10) (0.09) 
N 18,853 18,218 18,720 
 
Note: Panel A shows OLS regressions weighted by the county population of children under age 
six. Panel B shows multilevel models with random intercepts and slopes for counties nested in 
states. Enrollment and CPS reports are measured in logs. County-year level aggregated data 
drawn from NCANDS administrative CPS reports from 2003 – 2017.  
 
Table 2-4: Stratifications by public assistance 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 No PA PA 
  All  Abuse Neglect All  Abuse Neglect 
Panel A: Fixed Effects         
SPK 0.16 0.01 0.08 0.09 0.01 0.13 
 (0.15) (0.09) (0.10) (0.14) (0.10) (0.12) 
CCDF 0.12 -0.17 0.25 -0.59 -0.17 -0.44 
 (0.57) (0.42) (0.56) (0.57) (0.35) (0.54) 
HS/EHS 0.28 -0.08 0.07 -1.58 1.38 -0.78 
  (0.88) (0.63) (0.78) (1.67) (1.29) (1.79) 
N 4,900 4,488 4,783 4,979 4,174 4,735 
Panel B: Multilevel 
models             
SPK 0.03 -0.03 0.04 0.21*** 0.06 0.22*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) 
CCDF -0.08 -0.45*** -0.01 -0.41*** -0.32*** -0.27** 
 (0.09) (0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) 
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HS/EHS 0.31 0.37 0.02 -1.83*** 0.67 -0.72 
  (0.33) (0.28) (0.31) (0.40) (0.36) (0.39) 
N 4,900 4,488 4,783 4,979 4,174 4,735 
 
Note: Panel A shows OLS regressions weighted by the county population of children under age 
six. Panel B shows multilevel models with random intercepts and slopes for counties nested in 
states. Enrollment and CPS reports are measured in logs. County-year level aggregated data 
drawn from NCANDS administrative CPS reports from 2003 – 2017. PA = caregiver reported 
receiving any type of public assistance.   
 
 
Table 2-5:  ECEC programs for young children 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 CCDF Child Care Subsidies HS/EHS 
  All  Abuse Neglect All  Abuse Neglect 
Panel A: Fixed Effects           
< 12 months -0.09 -0.40 -0.18 -0.30 0.07 0.00 
 (0.12) (0.39) (0.22) (0.19) (0.83) (0.46) 
12 - 23 
months -0.08 -0.11 -0.26 -0.24 -0.08 0.02 
 (0.08) (0.22) (0.23) (0.12) (0.46) (0.49) 
24 - 36 
months -0.10 -0.13 -0.26 -0.31 -0.15 0.01 
 (0.08) (0.24) (0.23) (0.18) (0.44) (0.51) 
Panel B: Multilevel Models         
< 12 months -0.17*** -0.51*** -0.32*** -0.30** -0.46** 0.20 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.10) (0.15) (0.12) 
12 - 23 
months -0.11*** -0.14*** -0.36*** -0.30** -0.07 0.20 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.10) (0.15) (0.12) 
24 - 36 
months -0.14*** -0.13** -0.39*** -0.40*** -0.09 0.20 
  (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.10) (0.14) (0.12) 
N 9,421 9,106 9,382 9,421 9,106 9,382 
Note: Panel A shows OLS regressions weighted by the county population of children under age 
six. Panel B shows multilevel models with random intercepts and slopes for counties nested in 
states. Enrollment and CPS reports are measured in logs. County-year level aggregated data 
drawn from NCANDS administrative CPS reports from 2003 – 2017. PA = caregiver reported 






Table 2-6: DDD effect of enrollment jump  
 (1) (2) (3) 
  All  Abuse Neglect 
Panel A: Fixed 
Effects     
Elig*jump -0.04** -0.07 0.00 
 (0.01) (0.05) (0.02) 
Jump 0.08 0.16 0.05 
 (0.04) (0.12) (0.06) 
Elig  -0.06*** 0.15** -0.17*** 
  (0.01) (0.05) (0.01) 
Panel B: Multilevel Models   
Elig*jump -0.02 0.01 -0.01 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
Jump 0.02 0.11*** -0.07*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Elig  -0.05*** 0.14*** -0.14*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
N 47,126 45,635 46,895 
 
Note: Panel A shows DDD regressions weighted by the county population of children under age 
six. Panel B shows multilevel models with random intercepts and slopes for counties nested in 
states. County-year level aggregated data drawn from NCANDS administrative CPS reports from 
2003 – 2017. OLS models include county-specific linear time trends. Elig = child eligibility, 1 = 
age 4, 0 all other ages except age 3, who are omitted from this model. Jump = Binary indicator 
for whether an increase of enrollment of at least 50% occurred in the observed school year.   
 
Table 2-7: DDD effect of UPK  
 (1) (2) (3) 
  All  Abuse Neglect 
Panel A: Fixed Effects     
Univ*Elig -0.01 0.02 -0.01 
 (0.01) (0.08) (0.02) 
UPK 0.08 -0.03 -0.19 
 (0.04) (0.13) (0.17) 
Elig -0.05*** 0.15* -0.17*** 
  (0.01) (0.06) (0.01) 
Panel B: Multilevel 
Model     
Univ*Elig 0.01 0.07*** 0.00 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
UPK 0.05*** -0.1*** -0.25*** 
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 (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
Elig -0.05*** 0.11*** -0.14*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
N 47,126 45,635 46,895 
 
Note: Panel A shows DDD regressions weighted by the county population of children under age 
six. Panel B shows multilevel models with random intercepts and slopes for counties nested in 
states. County-year level aggregated data drawn from NCANDS administrative CPS reports from 
2003 – 2017. OLS models include county-specific linear time trends. Elig = child eligibility, 1 = 
age 4, 0 all other ages except age 3, who are omitted from this model. Univ = 1 for UPK 
introductions.   
 
Table 2-8: DDD effect of extended day 
 (1) (2) (3) 
  All  Abuse Neglect 
Panel A: Fixed Effects     
Extday*Elig -0.01 0.04 -0.02 
 (0.01) (0.05) (0.01) 
Extday  0.13** 0.27* 0.32* 
 (0.05) (0.13) (0.12) 
Elig -0.05*** 0.12** -0.15*** 
  (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) 
Panel B: Multilevel Model   
Extday*Elig -0.01 0.01 -0.02 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
Extday  0.09*** 0.26*** 0.3*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Elig -0.04*** 0.13*** -0.13*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
N 43,610 42,226 43,394 
 
Note: Panel A shows DDD regressions weighted by the county population of children under age 
six. Panel B shows multilevel models with random intercepts and slopes for counties nested in 
states. County-year level aggregated data drawn from NCANDS administrative CPS reports from 
2003 – 2017. Elig = child eligibility, 1 = age 4, 0 all other ages except age 3, who are omitted 








Table 2-9: Mandated reporter type 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Non-Child care/Educational 
MR Child care/Educational MR 
  All  Abuse Neglect All  Abuse Neglect 
Panel A: Fixed Effects           
SPK 0.03 0.08 0.13 -0.02 0.01 0.04 
 (0.02) (0.09) (0.08) (0.03) (0.07) (0.05) 
CCDF -0.06 -0.31 -0.20 -0.12 -0.17 -0.20 
 (0.11) (0.32) (0.20) (0.11) (0.16) (0.19) 
HS/EHS -0.19 0.19 0.02 -0.53 -0.45 -0.67 
  (0.15) (0.64) (0.48) (0.33) (0.29) (0.37) 
N 9,473 9,384 9,427 9,316 8,842 9,063 
Panel B: Multilevel model         
SPK 0.04* 0.02 0.124*** -0.01 -0.04* 0.03* 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
CCDF -0.13*** -0.40*** -0.33*** -0.15*** -0.14*** -0.3*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
HS/EHS -0.17 0.291* 0.39** -0.54*** -0.08 -0.76*** 
  (0.13) (0.15) (0.14) (0.11) (0.14) (0.14) 
N 9,473 9,384 9,427 9,316 8,842 9,063 
 
Note: Panel A shows OLS regressions weighted by the county population of children under age 
six. Panel B shows multilevel models with random intercepts and slopes for counties nested in 
states. Enrollment and CPS reports are measured in logs. County-year level aggregated data 
drawn from NCANDS administrative CPS reports from 2003 – 2017. MR = Mandated reporter.  
 
Appendix 
Table 2-A1: Alternative measures of child maltreatment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 










  All All All  All  
SPK -0.02 0.00 -0.02 0.00 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) 
CCDF -0.02 -0.058* 0.00 -0.053* 
 (0.15) (0.03) (0.17) (0.02) 
HS/EHS -0.10 0.03 -0.10 0.02 
  (0.20) (0.05) (0.22) (0.05) 





Table 2-A2: Effect of ECEC program enrollment on maltreatment, linear time trends included 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Log(CPS reports) 
  All  Abuse Neglect 
Panel A: Full sample   
SPK 0.02 0.05 0.11 
 (0.02) (0.08) (0.07) 
CCDF -0.12 -0.24 -0.15 
 (0.09) (0.30) (0.16) 
HS/EHS -0.12 0.13 -0.31 
  (0.14) (0.39) (0.23) 
N 9,479 9,391 9,432 
Panel B: Preschool sample   
SPK 0.03 0.03 0.13 
 (0.02) (0.07) (0.08) 
CCDF -0.12 -0.15 -0.19 
 (0.07) (0.31) (0.18) 
HS/EHS -0.35 -0.07 -0.39 
  (0.20) (0.43) (0.29) 
N 18,853 18,218 18,720 
 
 
Table 2-A3: Test of potential mechanisms, CCDF 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Income eligibility  Lowest copay 
 All Abuse Neglect All Abuse Neglect 
Panel A: Fixed effects           
 -0.000* 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.011* 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Panel B: Multilevel model           
 0.00 0.00 0.0001* 0.00 -0.005* 0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 








Table 2-A4: Effect of ECEC programs on child maltreatment, state-aggregated data 
 (1) (2) (3) 
  All Abuse Neglect 
Panel A: All children     
SPK 0.12** 0.06 0.21* 
 (0.04) (0.12) (0.08) 
CCDF -0.02 0.11 -0.03 
 (0.17) (0.14) (0.13) 
HS/EHS 1.32 0.91 0.79 
  (0.80) (0.61) (0.50) 
N 42,339 36,600 39,384 
Panel B: Preschoolers only (ages 3 and 4) 
SPK 0.16*** 0.074 0.19* 
 (0.04) (0.12) (0.08) 
CCDF -0.01 0.11 -0.04 
 (0.19) (0.15) (0.14) 
HS/EHS 1.37 0.89 0.63 
  (0.85) (0.64) (0.47) 
N 14,270 12,686 13,212 
Panel C: Children under age 3 years only 
SPK 0.10* 0.04 0.22* 
 (0.04) (0.13) (0.09) 
CCDF 0.00 0.13 -0.01 
 (0.17) (0.14) (0.13) 
HS/EHS 1.32 0.82 0.78 
  (0.78) (0.60) (0.50) 
N 27,885 23,595 25,941 
 
 
Table 2-A5: DDD models, state-aggregated data 
 (1) (2) (3) 
  All Abuse Neglect 
Panel A: Enrollment Shock   
Jump 0.04 0.05 0.05 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.05) 
Elig 0.12*** 0.32*** 0.01 
 (0.02) (0.05) (0.02) 
Jump*Elig -0.08 -0.12 -0.08 
  (0.05) (0.08) (0.05) 
N 45,731 38,236 42,601 
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Panel B: UPK Introduction   
Jump -0.05 -0.01 -0.10 
 (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) 
Elig 0.12*** 0.31*** 0.01 
 (0.02) (0.07) (0.02) 
Jump*Elig 0.02 0.06 0.02 
  (0.04) (0.10) (0.03) 
N 35,657 30,665 33,161 
Panel C: Extended day     
Ext day 0.06 0.13 0.15 
 (0.11) (0.10) (0.11) 
Elig 0.15*** 0.32*** 0.04 
 (0.02) (0.05) (0.02) 
Extday*Elig -0.03 0.00 -0.04 
  (0.02) (0.07) (0.02) 
N 32,694 28,106 30,441 
 
 
























VIII. Paper 3: Hot Tempered: New Evidence on Temperature and Child Maltreatment 
Abstract 
A burgeoning literature points to rising temperatures as a cause of widening disparities in 
cognitive and non-cognitive ability, birth rates, aggression, health, and other correlates of human 
capital (see e.g. Carleton & Hsiang, 2016). Children in particular are uniquely vulnerable to the 
insults of climate change. Extreme heat not only affects children directly in terms of infant 
mortality and early health, parents of young children are increasingly disconnected from 
protective resources and benefits, cultivating a stressful environment ripe for maltreatment when 
temperatures rise. Whether temperature directly predicts child maltreatment is unknown. To that 
end, in this paper I estimate the causal effect of temperature on child abuse by linking daily 
temperature data to the census of administrative Child Protective Services (CPS) reports for 48 
states from 2010 through 2017. In addition to weighted OLS models, I test whether Low Income 
Home Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP) state-level cooling support programs and air 
conditioning (a/c) penetration rates mitigate this effect. Overall, my preliminary results suggest 
that temperature affects child maltreatment reports, especially among infants younger than 12 
months.  Though I detect relatively larger effects among reports alleging neglect, that these often 
capture unsubstantiated abuse does not rule out heat stress as a potential mechanism. Air 
conditioning penetration rates partially mitigate this relationship, suggestive of large gains from 
expanding access to cooling support programs such as LIHEAP, though the direct effects of 
LIHEAP appear minimal at best. This work contributes to nascent knowledge on parenting 
behaviors and child health, unveiling potential long-term effects of extreme heat among the most 





Child maltreatment has increased by 12.2 percent since 2013, spurring new research into 
universal prevention policies and programs (U.S. Department of Health & Human Services 
Families et al., 2016). Poverty and income have emerged as relatively important structural risk 
factors for maltreatment based on causal studies linking labor market participation, minimum 
wages, and other macroeconomic indicators to abuse and neglect (Berger et al., 2016; Cancian et 
al., 2013; Lindo et al., 2018; Paxson & Waldfogel, 1999a, 2002, 2003b; Raissian & Bullinger, 
2017; Wildeman & Fallesen, 2017). The findings from these studies suggest that ‘parenting in 
despair’ – that with high levels of stress and depression coupled with limited access to services – 
is a tractable inequality. By extension, mitigating these effects early in life may plausibly 
ameliorate the parenting environment and ensuing child safety. That weather and temperature 
have been linked to crime and violent and aggressive behavior implies that harmful and 
aggressive parenting may be a natural derivative. Yet, whether these environmental factors 
known to predict the cognitive and non-cognitive correlates of maltreatment have a direct effect 
on abuse and neglect is presently unknown.  
In this article, I provide new evidence on the effects of temperature on child maltreatment and 
the effectiveness of air conditioning (a/c) and Low Income Home Energy Assistance Program 
(LIHEAP) state-cooling policies in mitigating these effects.  I first use nonlinear weighted 
regressions to estimate the effects of temperature on various measures of maltreatment. I then 
exploit variation in access to LIHEAP and a/c to provide causal estimates of the potential for 
these policies to offset disparate parenting on account of temperature. My preliminary findings 
suggest that extreme temperature is indeed linked to child maltreatment reports. I find that a 10 
degree increase in temperature is associated with an increase in CPS reports by 4.7 percent, 
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lending credence to the view that heat may affect parenting and/or reporting behaviors. Each 
additional day of heat exposure over 81 degrees increases CPS reports by .4 percent, or 2 reports 
per 100,000 children, though a/c penetration halves these effects.   
My paper is closely related to the literature on the impact of antipoverty policies on child 
maltreatment. I extend this literature in three dimensions. First, I demonstrate that extreme heat 
affects both physical abuse and neglectful parenting, though I find relatively larger effects on 
neglect. Importantly, an accusation of neglectful parenting does not omit physical abuse, it 
simply implies that neglect was proven in court or observed by a reporter.  Second, I show that 
expanding LIHEAP – an existing policy – could yield positive externalities in terms of child 
safety if the policy can spur a/c take-up beyond its current reach, potentially offsetting the 
notably large expenditures that result from expansion.  
My set of findings also extend the literature examining the effect of temperature on early 
disparities in health. That I detect the first indirect effect of temperature on child maltreatment 
implies that prior estimates of temperature and human capital projections for children may have 
been understated. Future research accounting for temperature related disparities should not 
ignore these indirect effects on children, especially as they may relay information about 
mechanisms through which other physical health effects operate (infant mortality, injury, etc.).  
This paper proceeds as follows. After a short discussion about child maltreatment and the various 
measures thereof, I describe prior literature in section IV, a/c and LIHEAP in section V, data in 





Child maltreatment is difficult to measure as the ‘true’ rate is inherently unobservable. Based on 
the cases that are known and reported to CPS, maltreatment is surprisingly common, with nearly 
37.4 percent of children having received a CPS investigation before their 18th birthday (Kim et 
al., 2017). Young children are particularly vulnerable to maltreatment, making up nearly half of 
all reports and fatalities (U.S. Department of Health & Human Services Families et al., 2016). 
Physical and sexual abuse, though among the most widely recognized types of maltreatment, are 
second and third to neglect, which appears in upwards of 60 percent of CPS reports. Neglect 
encompasses parental failure to provide food, clothing, shelter, and other factors that prevent 
harm to a child, as well as the omission of oversight (failure to watch a child to prevent them 
from harm or injury). Neglect is often used to penalize abusive parenting for which adequate 
proof is not available, and by extension, is also used to penalize a lack of supervision resulting in 
physical abuse by another caregiver such as a boyfriend or babysitter.  
CPS report rates are widely considered the best measure of maltreatment available, however, 
these are also thought to under-ascertain the true maltreatment rate as they capture only cases 
that have been observed and reported. Based on self-reports of maltreatment, the cumulative risk 
of maltreatment is estimated to be at least three times the rate of CPS confirmed maltreatment 
(Finkelhor, Turner, Shattuck, & Hamby, 2013; Stoltenborgh, Bakermans-Kranenburg, Alink, & 
van IJzendoorn, 2015; Wildeman et al., 2014). Further, most cases reported to CPS result in an 
unsubstantiated finding either through an evaluation or full investigation. Unsubstantiated CPS 
reports are highly predictive of later substantiated maltreatment (Palusci, Smith, & Paneth, 
2005), fatal injuries (Putnam-Hornstein, 2011; Putnam-Hornstein, Cleves, Licht, & Needell, 
2013), serious injuries (Schneiderman, Leslie, Hurlburt, Zhang, & Horwitz, 2012), and ED use 
(Schneiderman, Hurlburt, Leslie, Zhang, & Horwitz, 2012) giving credence to the claim that 
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maltreatment is under-ascertained even among cases known to CPS. CPS agencies are forced to 
prioritize cases and unless the alleged maltreatment is severe enough, investigators may lack 
adequate proof to make a substantiated finding. As a result, many high-risk families are turned 
away, often without prevention services or otherwise.  
Prior Literature 
As this is the first study to document the relationship between temperature and maltreatment, I 
document here the ancillary evidence on potential mechanisms through which heat exposure 
might affect child maltreatment.  
Increased temperatures appear to consistently affect physical health and mortality (see e.g. 
Barreca, Clay, Deschenes, Greenstone, & Shapiro, 2016).  As parents with compromised health 
are more likely to be perpetrators of physical abuse, the burden of illness might compromise non-
cognitive stability among caregivers, giving way to more violent and aggressive interactions. A 
large body of literature links extreme heat and weather with aggressive behavior, criminality, and 
conflict, the most plausible potential pathway to physical child abuse. Two recent reviews 
concluded that a 1-SD increase in temperature would increase interpersonal violence by 2.4 to 4 
percent (Burke, Hsiang, & Miguel, 2015; Hsiang, Burke, & Miguel, 2013). Similar findings 
unveiled the role of temperature on aggressive behavior and interpersonal violence (Larrick, 
Timmerman, Carton, & Abrevaya, 2011). One study found that only extreme temperature shocks 
predicted violence in the immediate term, followed by a decline in crime in the period after the 
weather shock (Jacob, Lefgren, & Moretti, 2007). Neuroscientists have long observed depressed 
cognitive function and other forms of psychological dysfunction as the result of increased 
temperature as well (see e.g. Seppanen, Fisk, & Lei, 2006). Cognitive and non-cognitive ability 
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and endowments are protective factors for child abuse, through knowledge of child development 
and the ability to moderate mood or temper. Similarly, a sustained reduction in cognitive and 
non-cognitive ability might affect violence through an increase in stress, and a cumulative effect 
on the family budget and the multiple hardships thereof. 
Temperature affects children differently than it does adults (Zivin & Shrader, 2016). Children are 
more vulnerable to temperature in general, though the effects of exposure in utero and during 
infancy are moderate relative to other shocks. One systematic review unveiled a strong 
correlation between extreme temperatures and infant mortality, preterm birth, and birthweight 
(Strand, Barnett, & Tong, 2011). If increased temperature causes a direct increase in infant 
mortality, then the net effect might be biased by selection, with fewer births of less-healthy 
children, effectively decreasing child maltreatment on the population level.  Alternatively, an 
increase in preterm birth might reduce mean infant health in the other direction, resulting in more 
less-healthy children, resulting in an ambiguous overall effect. If temperature causes a reduction 
in overall infant and child health, we might expect to see an increase in child maltreatment at the 
mean, as children with poorer health are more likely victims of maltreatment.   
Air Conditioning and Cooling-support Programs 
Though a/c has steadily grown in prevalence since the 1970s, lagging wages and mounting 
electricity rates have resulted in vast disparities (Biddle, 2008). Even in the period of this study, 
a/c penetration in this sample ranges from a mean of 85 percent among renters to 90 percent 
among families with young children. As young families in particular are uniquely disconnected 
from resources and have relatively lower wages, their ability to rent or buy newer homes with 
central a/c or to purchase portable units is relatively constrained. The Low Income Home Energy 
Assistance Program (LIHEAP) aims to subsidize energy costs to families in the form of reduced 
86 
 
energy bills, responding to and preventing energy crisis, and long-term preventative services 
such as weatherization and home repairs. Authorized under Title XXVI of the Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1981 (Public Law 97-35), state LIHEAP programs received upwards of 
$3.69B in appropriations for 2019. Though federal statutes provide some guidance as to benefit 
eligibility, states are given the flexibility to increase minimum income standards, to offer 
additional crisis support, and to offer cooling programs (a considerably lower priority in most 
states than heating support). In general, families with young children under six years are a key 
target group (along with the elderly and disabled), especially those whose income falls under the 
federal guidelines of 150 % FPL threshold (or 60 % of state median income).  
According to the most recent LIHEAP report to congress (2014), approximately 6.7M 
households received LIHEAP assistance in 2014, 1M of whom received cooling assistance, with 
$336 average cooling benefits per household/year, with state payments ranging between $121 
(Arkansas) and $1,246 (D.C.). Compared to all households, for whom cooling costs represent 10 
percent of their annual expenditures, LIHEAP recipients report spending half as much on 
cooling. Compared to the 7.5% of all households without cooling, 11.4 % of LIHEAP recipients 
and 10.9% for all low-income households are without any cooling at all. According to the 2018 
LIHEAP state plans, 15 states either offer no cooling support or limit their support such that two 
or more summer months are missed (11 miss July and August entirely).14 The remainder offer 
full cooling programs (26) or some form of summer crisis support. These statistics suggest that 
                                                 
 
14 See table 3-A1 in the appendix to see how state LIHEAP offerings vary by month and year between 2014 and 
2018. Table 3-A2 shows this same information visually including summer crisis programs as well.  
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cooling is of a much lower priority, and that the reach for cooling funds is limited. Though 
LIHEAP cooling programs have substantial reach, low-income households are less likely to 
receive cooling support in general, and those that do use substantially less cooling support than 
heating support.  
State LIHEAP cooling programs vary in terms of seasonal availability and benefit generosity. 
For instance, though cooling support is available year-round in Arkansas, similarly warm states, 
such as Arizona and Alabama offer cooling for the spring/ summer only (April 1 – October 31 
and June 1 – September 30, respectively). Benefit levels vary drastically as well. Families in 
Alabama receive benefits ranging from $305 to $460, while those in Arizona receive anywhere 
from $75 to $800. As these programs have changed over time in both dimensions, I constructed a 
database of LIHEAP policies from 2014 – 2018 based on state LIHEAP plans. This database 
reflects not only the operating dates for state programs in this period as they change over time, it 
also reflects the turning off and on of funding, allowing programs to go in and out of operation. 
For instance, Delaware revised their cooling program dates from 2014 to 2015, adding an 
additional 15 days to the beginning of the period and removing one month at the end in the 
following year. Georgia introduced a new cooling program in 2018 (that had been abolished in 
the three years prior), as did West Virginia and Maryland, while Indiana introduced a new 
program in 2015 and Illinois eliminated their program in 2016. The states without any summer 
cooling support, including crisis cooling, include Connecticut, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, 




I use several data sets to estimate the effects of temperature on CPS reports. I discuss each in 
turn.  
My core data are drawn from NCANDS administrative child files, which capture the census of 
Child Protective Services (CPS) reports from 2010 through 2017. Counties with fewer than 
1,000 reports are omitted in the restricted sample, limiting generalizability to larger counties with 
relatively balanced panels. Key outcomes include the log of the overall CPS report rate, each 
major maltreatment subgroup (abuse and neglect), the rate of substantiated reports, and the rate 
of removal into foster care. I retain information on key demographic characteristics and report / 
reporter characteristics as well. Though the raw data capture the exact date of each report, these 
values are masked in the restricted data such that the first two weeks of the month are coded as 
the 8th day of the month and the remaining days as the 23rd. For this reason, I aggregate these 
data to the 8th and 23rd of each month by county x maltreatment type x child age x race such 
that each observation represents the count of demographic-specific CPS reports in a two-week 
span.  The external data that I describe in the following paragraphs is similarly aggregated.  
Temperature data comes from the PRISM Daily Weather Data for Contiguous United States. 
This series provides the raw daily min and max temperature and total precipitation for the 
contiguous United States, acquired with permission from the original author.15 Whereas station-
level data is inconsistent due to station closures, reporting gaps, and instrument failures, these 
data reflect the weighted average temperature and precipitation values for 10 surrounding 
                                                 
 
15 Many thanks to Dr. Wolfram Schlenker, Columbia University 
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stations, reported in 2.5x2.5mi grids that I aggregate to the county using the included geocodes. 
This allows for a consistent time series that smooths estimates that would be otherwise noisy.  
I use SEER for county-level population data (annual) in order to weight my estimates by the 
county population of children of the same ages. County-level poverty estimates come from 
SAIPE. Air Quality Index (AQI) data comes from the EPA’s Pre-Generated Data Files. These 
capture the daily AQI as well as the categorical severity. Air conditioning penetration rates come 
from the American Housing Survey (2010 – 2017), and I scraped the policy variables describing 
LIHEAP and state cooling programs from the LIHEAP data warehouse. 
Empirical Methodology 
Temperature and maltreatment 
To estimate the effect of temperature on child maltreatment, my primary OLS regression takes 
the following form:  
(1) 𝑌𝑗𝑘𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛾𝑇𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑗𝑘𝑡 +  𝛿1𝑋𝑗𝑘𝑡 +  𝛿2𝑇𝑡  +  𝛿3𝐶𝑘  +  𝛿4𝐴𝑄𝐼𝑡 + 𝛿5𝐴𝑄𝐼2𝑡 +
 𝛿6𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑘 +  𝛿7𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑝2𝑘 +  𝜃𝑇𝑅𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑘𝑡 +  𝜀𝑗𝑘𝑡 
 
Where Y is the child maltreatment measure for children living in county k, in state j, in two-
week periods, t. Y is one of several measures for child maltreatment. The coefficient of interest, 
𝛾, is interpreted as the impact of temperature (TEMP) on child maltreatment outcomes. 
Temperature is measured in one of two ways. My primary measure is the two-week average max 
daily temperature for county k in which the child resides. I specify this variable in terms of the 
raw temperature (F) with a quadratic term and as a series of 10°F bins, representing a count of 
the number of days in each two-week period with temperatures in each bin. This specification is 
intended to flexibly allow for nonlinearities in temperature detected in other studies linking 
90 
 
health and behavior to climate. In the models with bin measures, I exclude the 70 − 79°F bin to 
enable an interpretation of relative exposure, or dosage effects.  
The vector of covariates, X includes key child demographics (age, race/ethnicity, gender, and 
maltreatment type). In addition to including year (T) and county (C) fixed effects to account for 
common correlated effects (such as the recession) and county-specific drivers of maltreatment, 
respectively, I also include an indicator for season (Season) to account for differences that might 
drive differences in reporting and temperature. I also test the robustness of my results against the 
inclusion of county-specific time trends (TREND) to smooth regional trends in maltreatment and 
to account for within-county compositional changes that might be correlated with temperature 
(labor market effects not captured by my macro controls, for instance). All regressions are 
weighted by the county population of children younger than six years to account for relative 
differences in reporting and observation rates. Following Lee & Lemieux (2010), I use White 
heteroskedastic-robust standard errors clustered at the state level for computational ease.  
The effects of temperature must be identified independent of other markers of climate change 
that might further aggravate the effects of temperature. As such, I include county-level measures 
for air quality (AQI) and precipitation (PRECIP) as controls in my primary specifications. As air 
quality measures are not collected daily by most stations, I use the continuous three-day rolling 
average Air Quality Index (AQI), testing the robustness of my results against a categorical 
indicator for air quality levels (good, moderate, unhealthy for sensitive groups, unhealthy, very 
unhealthy, and hazardous). The AQI is comprised of several pollutant concentrations, though 
most days rely on particulate matter (< 2.5 microns) and ozone (O3). As precipitation and air 
pollution have been found in previous literature to have similarly nonlinear effects, I include 
quadratic terms for each. 
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My key identifying assumption is that temperature is random and orthogonal to the unobserved 
determinants of child maltreatment. This is feasible as temperature is unpredictable. Parents or 
caregivers are unlikely to decide whether to engage in child maltreatment based on prior 
knowledge of the weather. The density of temperatures, shown in figure 3-2, supports this 
assertion.  
One way to overcome any reservations with this assumption is to employ a Regression 
Discontinuity (RD) around the start of a heatwave. Though this approach may be feasible in 
daily data, two-week aggregated data are more limited in that heatwave periods of three or more 
days cannot be separated from non-heatwave days. A key assumption for RD analysis requires 
evidence of a discontinuity around the heatwave threshold, on that is untenable in this setting 
given that most heatwaves do not last as long as one would need for a large enough bandwidth.  
Air conditioning penetration 
Prior estimates of a/c penetration rates relied heavily on household a/c data from the Decennial 
Census, which dropped this question from their survey beginning in 1990. I improve upon this 
method by introducing a novel source of a/c penetration rate data – the American Housing 
Survey (AHS) covering most years from 2010 – 2017. From 2010 – 2013, I use one variable that 
asks whether the respondent had any a/c in the home, along with two variables to determine 
whether the cooling source was central a/c, or portable air conditioners (the number of which are 
reported). I aggregate the AHS sample to the metropolitan level such that the penetration rate is 
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measured as the fraction of households with any a/c, matched to county-period CPS reports.16 
For 2015 and 2017, I use similar variables that indicate the types of primary and secondary a/c 
sources in the home. For all years, I generate penetration estimates for all households, those with 
young children, and for renting households. To estimate whether a/c mitigates the effects of 
temperature on child maltreatment, I include in my primary specification an interaction term 
between a/c penetration rates and the measures of temperature.  
LIHEAP and maltreatment 
As my primary estimates are in the reduced form, I regress a/c penetration rates on LIHEAP 
program availability at the county level to establish a causal pathway, ensuring that the results I 
detect in second-stage models are not spurious.  
To assess the effect of LIHEAP cooling programs on child maltreatment, I use the same basic 
model set forth in equation (1) with an interaction between TEMP and an indicator for whether 
LIHEAP funds were available in the observation period based on the LIHEAP policy variables I 
describe above. I eliminate the Season indicator and limit the sample to the period between April 
1st and September 30th.  
To explore whether CPS report rates changed directly as the result of LIHEAP summer cooling 
programs, I then employ a series of event-history regressions in the periods before and after the 
start of the LIHEAP cooling period, estimating the following equation:  
(2) 𝑌𝑘𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽 𝐶𝑘 + 𝜌𝑇𝑡 +  𝛾𝑋𝑘𝑡 + ∑ 𝜃𝑝𝐿𝐼𝐻𝐸𝐴𝑃𝑘𝑡
𝑝
𝑝∈𝑃 +  𝜀𝑘𝑡 
                                                 
 





 is a series of dummy variables equal to 1 for the counties in which LIHEAP 
cooling program was in place for 𝑝 periods, defined as two-week bins grouped into months, such 
that 𝑃 = {-6, -5, -4, -3, -2, -1, 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} months, with the month of the LIHEAP opening 
as the omitted category (0). I include only states with summer LIHEAP cooling-only programs 
(crisis-only states and non-LIHEAP states are excluded), though in robustness checks, I group 
together the non-LIHEAP states to estimate a counterfactual trajectory for the same period. I 
estimate models with and without county-specific linear time trends, though only report the latter 
as these represent my more conservative estimates. 
Results 
The sample of children under age six years follows the expected demographic distributions (table 
3-1). Importantly, only 20% of the sample has a LIHEAP cooling policy in place at the time of 
observation (from 2014 onward) and a/c penetration rates average 87% though have a much 
larger, right-skewed range. Maximum temperature ranges from 5 – 112, though the average and 
low temperatures are much lower (not shown). I concentrate on the maximum daily temperature 
as this aligns with the timing during the day when maltreatment is most likely to occur. The 
number of CPS reports per child age X race X county X two-week window averages 4.03, 
though the range stretches from 1 to 159. 
Regressing CPS reports on the average maximum daily temperature reveals a statistically 
significant, nonlinear relationship (table 3-A1 in the appendix). Visual inspection of the raw 
relationship between these variables is shown in figure 3-3 disaggregated by children’s age in 
years. Interestingly, the relationship appears to be more acute for younger children. Measuring 
the deviation of the maximum daily temperature from the monthly average follows the same 
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general pattern (figure 3-4), revealing a point of diminishing returns at around 3 degrees. To 
better understand the role of intensity of exposure, I focus on binned measures of the number of 
days children were exposed to temperature bins for each two-week period for the remainder of 
the paper.  
Using a binned measure of the number of days in each two-week period children experienced 
extreme heat (table 3-2), it is clear that relative to the reference category (61 – 70 degrees F), 
children who experience more days with intense heat are the subject of more CPS reports, 
regardless of measure, than are children in colder temperatures. As the center of the temperature 
range (from 31 – 60 degrees F) appears uniform, I collapse these again to five categories I use 
throughout the paper (table 3-3). Interestingly, the highest heat bin is indistinguishable from the 
reference category (60-75 degrees F), suggesting that either the effects within this category are 
masked, or that after 105 degrees, the effect fades. Overall, this estimate suggests that for each 
additional day in heat above 75 degrees F, CPS reports increase by 3 percent, or 1.5 reports per 
county X two weeks X child demographics. Table 3-4 shows the same regression disaggregated 
by children’s age in years, revealing the largest effects among the youngest children (columns 1 
and 2).  
Motivated by these results, I then estimate whether these effects differ based upon children’s age. 
The regression results point to a very consistent relationship, which I then plot in figure 3-5. This 
figure suggests that relative to the reference category, increased exposure to low-temperature 
days reduces maltreatment rates for children of all ages. The relationship becomes positive for all 
age groups at 75 degrees F, however is more intense for younger children. Five year old children 
see a decline in reports after this point, whereas younger children see a sustained increase of 
about 2 – 6 reports / 100,000 children, following a decline for all groups when temperatures soar 
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above 105 degrees F. Abuse reports follow the same general pattern, though the effects are much 
smaller and only positive for children three years and younger (see appendix figure 3-A1). 
Neglect reports follow the same pattern as all reports (figure 3-A2).  Table 3-A3 (appendix) 
displays this same pattern of result, highlighting the concentration of abuse effects among 
younger children in the 90 – 105 degree F range.  
Overall, these findings suggest that extreme heat is linked to an increase in CPS reports. The 
relationship is more pronounced and consistent among younger children, who are physiologically 
vulnerable to heat and to maltreatment and prone to triggering behaviors such as  crying, illness, 
malaise, etc. While it is not possible to parse out these effects in the context of this analysis, 
future studies might try to observe children and parents under heat-related stress. That heat 
exposure bears a stronger relationship to neglect reports suggests that ‘parenting in despair’ is 
less likely to resolve with physical punishment but not ignorable. For instance, a high-risk family 
may be more likely to engage in stressful parenting under acute heat (e.g. yelling, shooing 
children outside, children falling due to lack of supervision), resulting in a neglect report rather 
than one of abuse. That being said, temperature bears the strongest relationship with abuse 
among the youngest children, suggesting that both types of maltreatment are subject to heat.  
To test whether a/c penetration rates mitigate this effect, I bin a/c penetration rates into quintiles 
and interact each a/c quintile with each temperature exposure bin. The continuous interaction 
between a/c penetration and CPS reports (appendix table 3-A2) highlights the effects I display in 
figure 3-6, but with temperature bins. Among children in high-a/c penetration metro areas (3-5), 
above the 50th percentile, the relationship between increasing temperatures and CPS reports is 
uniform. In the lowest a/c penetration quintile, increasing temperatures result in more CPS 
reports. These findings, together with those in table 3-A2, suggest that a/c penetration rates are 
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indeed effective for those in the lowest a/c penetration rate regions. In figure 3-A3 (appendix) I 
show the lowest and highest quartiles compared across younger children (younger than 2) and 
older children (2 – 5 years). These figures follow the same pattern, illustrating the relatively 
higher CPS report rates in low a/c regions (top panel) compared to that in the highest a/c 
penetration regions.  
LIHEAP is a means-tested program that in some states, offers stipends for recipients to use 
toward cooling support. In table 3-5, I show the results of a regression where the LIHEAP policy 
indicator is interacted with each respective temperature exposure bin for three samples, as 
indicated at the top of the table. The interaction effects are largely null, as is the main effect, 
suggesting that LIHEAP fails to mitigate the maltreatment-related consequences of extreme heat. 
Though a regression of a/c penetration rates on LIHEAP availability reveals a small, statistically 
significant effect (table 3-A4, column 1), this effect loses significance when county-specific 
linear time trends are included in the model (column 2), suggesting that LIHEAP does not have a 
first-stage effect on maltreatment. Next, I employ an event history model in order to compare the 
leads and lags around the time the LIHEAP funding turns on. These results, shown in figure 3-7, 
imply that the CPS report rates are lower prior to LIHEAP policies turning on, following a peak 
in the second month followed by a gradual decline. Though the overall report rate falls near to 
that in the pre-law period, abuse report rates are higher in the post-law period, implying that 
LIHEAP availability correlates with an increase, rather than a decrease in reports.  
Though these findings point to a relationship between heat and CPS reports, it could be that 
within seasons, any increase in CPS is due to heightened visibility (children playing outside 
more likely to attract reporter’s attention) rather than maltreatment itself. If the increase in 
reports I detect is not in fact an artifact of parental behavior but rather that of reporting, any 
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residual effects of temperature on CPS reports should not persist during the summer months 
alone, when the variation in heat is relatively lower. To test this assertion, I limit my sample to 
July and August and stratify by whether the report was indeed substantiated, as shown in table 3-
6. In panel A, the gradient in reporting among unsubstantiated reports follows the same pattern 
as it had before, with negative effects relative to the reference category (60-75 degrees) and 
positive effects in the 90-105 degrees F category. In the substantiated cases (panel B), the 
coefficients follow a different pattern. In the lowest temperature category, I detect relatively 
large positive effects on abuse (columns 2 and 5), yet find negative effects on neglect (columns 3 
and 6). Coefficients in higher temperature categories are positive for all reports and neglect 
reports, yet only marginally so for abuse reports, giving further support to the notion that 
parental behavior is linked to temperature. This could be the case if parents are more likely to fail 
to provide oversight during high-heat days spurring an uptick in injuries that may spur reporting. 
As neglect reports may capture only the type of maltreatment for which the burden of proof was 
adequate, we cannot rule out abuse in these cases as well.  
My findings imply that while child maltreatment reports may derive in part from exposure to 
extreme heat, a/c penetration may be an effective mitigation strategy, especially in low-
penetration metro areas. LIHEAP may be a promising solution to increase a/c penetration, 
though the overall take-up of the program is either too low or dispersed to effect child 
maltreatment. These results are robust to various specifications and follow the hypothesized 
patterns in terms of age. The relatively larger effects on neglect, as opposed to abuse, merit 





This paper provides the first evidence that temperature and exposure to extreme heat are linked 
to child maltreatment. My findings imply that a 10 degree increase in temperature increases CPS 
reports by 4.7 percent.  A/c penetration rates nearly halve these effects, implying that expanding 
access to a/c through cooling support programs may be a promising approach to maltreatment 
prevention. I detect much larger effects among younger children, for whom the consequences of 
maltreatment are more salient. As infants account for nearly half of CPS reports alone, mitigating 
inequalities in a/c access might plausibly improve child safety for this group of children.  
Given the projected increases in temperature in the coming years (see figure 3-1), documenting 
the potential effects is critical to the construction of anticipatory policies, bearing in mind the 
potential for existing disparities to only further diverge in more extreme conditions. Outsized 
impacts on young children are of particular concern, given the salience of early life experiences 
for adulthood health and human capital (Almond et al., 2017; Currie & Rossin-Slater, 2015). 
Indeed, there is a strong theoretical argument for identifying broad-sweeping policies to improve 
early child safety that affect health and human capital down the line. That children bear direct 
and indirect consequences of extreme heat, as I detect here, implies that policymakers should 
focus funding on the early childhood period. State cooling programs should target their efforts to 
families with young children, especially those in homes without central a/c. LIHEAP cooling 
programs are active in four states year-round, in the summer for the majority of states. Six states 
do not have a cooling program in place at all, and 15 offer support only on a crisis basis (when 
funding is available). As LIHEAP is an existing policy with in-place funding streams, expanding 
the reach of support for a/c purchases and installments could reduce maltreatment in the long 





Figure 3-1: Projected number of extreme heat days in four US Cities 
 
Note: Each projection is the ensemble average of business-as-usual scenario forecasts for the 
continental United States. 
Sources: (Zivin & Shrader, 2016), adapted from Katherine Hayhoe et al., "Development and 
Dissemination of a High-Resolution National Climate Change Dataset," Final Report for United 
States Geological Survey, USGS G10AC00248 (2013); Anne M. K. Stoner et al., "An 
Asynchronous Regional Regression Model for Statistical Downscaling of Daily Climate 
Variables," International Journal of Climatology 33 (2013): 2473-94; Melinda S. Dalton and 
Sonya A. Jones, comps., Southeast Regional Assessment Project for the National Climate 










































Note: This figure shows the coefficients from separate regressions estimating the effect of days 
of exposure to temperatures in each of five bins relative to the excluded reference category (60-
75 degrees F) by children’s age in years. All models include demographic controls, quadratic 
terms for air quality and precipitation, county, year, and season fixed effects, and county-specific 
linear time trends. Data are NCANDS administrative CPS reports aggregated to the county-two-













Note: This figure shows the coefficients from separate regressions estimating the effect of days 
of exposure to temperatures in each of five bins relative to the excluded reference category (60-
75 degrees F) by the quintile of a/c penetration rates in a child’s metro region (1 = lowest, 5 = 
highest). All models include demographic controls, quadratic terms for air quality and 
precipitation, county, year, and season fixed effects, and county-specific linear time trends. Data 
are NCANDS administrative CPS reports aggregated to the county-two-week period-age-race-









Figure 3-7: Event History study of the effect of LIHEAP on CPS report rate / 100,000 children 
 
Note: This figure shows the coefficients from an event history model estimating the effect of 
LIHEAP availability on CPS reports by maltreatment type. All models include demographic 
controls, quadratic terms for air quality and precipitation, county, year, and season fixed effects, 
and county-specific linear time trends. Data are NCANDS administrative CPS reports aggregated 




Table 3-1: Summary statistics 
  mean/freq. min max 
LIHEAP 20.89% 0.00 1.00 
a/c penetration 87.20% 0.13 1.00 
Max temp 71.98 5.25 112.51 
Precipitation (inches) 2.49 0.01 67.57 
Air Quality 55.43 0.00 570.00 
    
CPS reports/county/two weeks 4.03 1.00 159.00 
Abuse 22.08%   
Neglect 44.28%   
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Sexual  8.62%   
Psychological 5.60%   
Other 5.44%   
No Maltreatment 13.99%   
    
Child age (years)    
0 16.81%   
1 15.47%   
2 16.05%   
3 16.78%   
4 17.23%   
5 17.67%   
    
Child race/ethnicity    
white 30.29%   
black 28.60%   
Hispanic 27.74%   
other 13.37%     
Total 3,098,695   
 
 
Table 3-2: Temperature and CPS reports 












Days at max temp (ref = 61 - 70 degrees F)   
< 30 degrees -0.003*** -0.028* -0.003*** -0.027** 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
31 - 40 degrees 0.00 -0.010* 0.00 -0.011* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
41 - 50 degrees 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
51 - 60 degrees 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
71 - 80 degrees 0.003*** 0.016*** 0.003*** 0.017*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
81 - 90 degrees 0.004*** 0.020*** 0.004*** 0.020*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
91 - 100 degrees 0.004*** 0.018*** 0.004*** 0.021*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
101 degrees + 0.00 0.016*** 0.00 0.015*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Child age in years (ref = < 12 months)   
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One year -0.151*** -0.837*** -0.152*** -0.840*** 
 (0.02) (0.08) (0.02) (0.08) 
Two years -0.143*** -0.820*** -0.143*** -0.822*** 
 (0.02) (0.08) (0.02) (0.08) 
Three years -0.138*** -0.856*** -0.138*** -0.857*** 
 (0.01) (0.09) (0.01) (0.09) 
Four years -0.129*** -0.840*** -0.130*** -0.841*** 
 (0.02) (0.10) (0.02) (0.10) 
Five years -0.107*** -0.738*** -0.107*** -0.738*** 
 (0.02) (0.10) (0.02) (0.10) 
Child race (ref = white/non-Hispanic)   
Black 0.124* 0.03 0.124* 0.03 
 (0.06) (0.18) (0.06) (0.18) 
Hispanic 0.17 0.06 0.17 0.06 
 (0.15) (0.75) (0.15) (0.75) 
Other -0.483*** -1.911*** -0.484*** -1.915*** 
  (0.09) (0.40) (0.09) (0.41) 
Constant 0.083* 8.849*** -0.03 8.093*** 
 (0.04) (0.14) (0.07) (0.25) 
r2 0.36 0.46 0.36 0.46 
N 3,098,695 3,098,695 3,098,695 3,098,695 
Season FE X X X X 
Year FE X X X X 
County FE X X X X 
County-LTT   X X 
 
Note: All models include demographic controls, quadratic terms for air quality and precipitation, 
county, year, and season fixed effects, and county-specific linear time trends. Temperature bins 
count the number of days in each two-week period a child was exposed to temperatures in the 




Table 3-3: Temperature (binned) and CPS reports 







Days at max temp (60 - 75 degrees ref) 
< 45 degrees -0.003*** -0.019*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
45 - 60 degrees 0.00 -0.01 
 (0.00) (0.01) 
75 - 90 degrees 0.003*** 0.015*** 
108 
 
 (0.00) 0.00  
90 - 105 degrees 0.003*** 0.015*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
>= 105 degrees 0.00 0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) 
Constant -0.01 8.165*** 
 (0.07) (0.25) 
r2 0.36 0.46 
N 3,098,695 3,098,695 
Season FE X X 
Year FE X X 
County FE X X 
County-LTT X X 
 
Note: All models include demographic controls, quadratic terms for air quality and precipitation, 
county, year, and season fixed effects, and county-specific linear time trends. Temperature bins 
count the number of days in each two-week period a child was exposed to temperatures in the 




Table 3-4: Temperature and child maltreatment stratified by child age in years 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 < 12 months 1 year 2 years 3 years 4 years 5 years 
Panel A: Log (CPS reports)           
< 45 degrees -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00* -0.00* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
45 - 60 degrees 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
75 - 90 degrees 0.00** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00** 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
90 - 105 degrees 0.00** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00** 0.00* 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
>= 105 degrees 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01** 0.00 0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Constant -136.57*** 15.82 -112.99*** -53.07*** 51.34*** 81.29*** 
 -15.71 -11.37 -11.75 -5.58 -12.89 -12.56 
r2 0.43 0.37 0.37 0.36 0.35 0.34 
N 542,394 477,281 495,819 515,933 527,417 539,851 
Panel B: reports per 100,000 children         
< 45 degrees -0.01** -0.02*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.02*** -0.01*** 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
45 - 60 degrees 0.00 -0.01 -0.01* -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
75 - 90 degrees 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01 
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 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
90 - 105 degrees 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.01*** 0.01** 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
>= 105 degrees 0.02*** 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
Constant -1139.26*** 246.03*** -1000.27*** -363.28*** 238.76*** 892.37*** 
 -44.71 -34.47 -28.94 -31.07 -46.37 -32.76 
r2 0.45 0.47 0.47 0.48 0.48 0.47 
N 542,394 477,281 495,819 515,933 527,417 539,851 
Season FE X X X X X X 
Year FE X X X X X X 
County FE X X X X X X 
County-LTT X X X X X X 
 
Note: All models include demographic controls, quadratic terms for air quality and precipitation, 
county, year, and season fixed effects, and county-specific linear time trends. Temperature bins 
count the number of days in each two-week period a child was exposed to temperatures in the 




Table 3-5: LIHEAP and CPS reports 










< 45 degrees -0.008** -0.001** -0.001** 
 (0.00) 0.00  0.00  
LIHEAP -0.049 -0.001 -0.004 
 (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) 
< 45 degrees*LIHEAP 0.059 -0.008** -0.008** 
 (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) 
45 - 60 degrees -0.001 0 0.001 
 (0.00) 0.00  (0.00) 
45 - 60 
degrees*LIHEAP 0.001 -0.004*** -0.004** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
75 - 90 degrees -0.004** 0 0 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
75 - 90 
degrees*LIHEAP 0.003 0.001 0.001 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
90 - 105 degrees 
-
0.006*** -0.002*** -0.001* 
 (0.00) 0.00  (0.00) 
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90 - 105 
degrees*LIHEAP 0.002 0 0 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
>= 105 degrees 
-
0.013*** -0.005*** -0.064*** 
 (0.00) 0.00  (0.01) 
>= 105 
degrees*LIHEAP 0.006 0.001 0.060*** 






 -174.745 -5.697 -6.842 
r2 0.25 0.247 0.251 
N 1,130,840 2,462,409 1,485,881 
Season FE X X X 
Year FE X X X 
County FE X X X 
County-LTT X X X 
 
Note: All models include demographic controls, quadratic terms for air quality and precipitation, 
county, year, and season fixed effects, and county-specific linear time trends. Temperature bins 
count the number of days in each two-week period a child was exposed to temperatures in the 




Table 3-6: CPS reports and temperature, July and August only 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 








Panel A: Unsubstantiated reports     
45 - 60 
degrees 0.04*** -0.02*** -0.06*** 0.21*** -0.08*** -0.21*** 
 0.00  0.00  0.00  (0.05) (0.01) (0.03) 
75 - 90 
degrees 0.02*** 0.01*** 0.02*** 0.24*** 0.05*** 0.15*** 
 0.00  0.00  0.00  (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) 
90 - 105 
degrees 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.26*** 0.06*** 0.15*** 
 0.00  0.00  0.00  (0.04) (0.01) (0.02) 
>= 105 
degrees 0.02** 0.01 0.01 0.23*** 0.07** 0.13** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.06) (0.02) (0.04) 
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Constant 82.38* 32.94 91.96*** -139.74 908.19*** 401.67* 
 (33.21) (35.71) (19.59) (307.97) (120.34) (186.83) 
r2 0.59 0.43 0.54 0.44 0.59 0.5 
N 216678 77673 176819 216678 77673 176819 
Panel B: Substantiated reports         
45 - 60 
degrees 0 0.06*** -0.01** 0.01 0.16*** -0.03 
 0.00  (0.01) 0.00  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
75 - 90 
degrees 0.01*** 0.01* 0.01*** 0.08*** 0.01 0.06*** 
 0.00  0.00  0.00  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
90 - 105 
degrees 0.02*** 0.01* 0.02*** 0.08*** 0.01 0.06*** 
 0.00  0.00  0.00  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
>= 105 
degrees 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.06** 0.02 0.04* 
  (0.01) 0.00  (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
Constant -28.53 99.03*** 104.33*** 371.37* 484.27*** 1008.04*** 
 (23.31) (16.74) (29.04) (138.70) (29.94) (145.53) 
r2 0.52 0.29 0.48 0.51 0.74 0.56 
N 127104 26653 103793 127104 26653 103793 
Season FE x x x x x x 
Year FE x x x x x x 
County FE x x x x x x 
County-LTT x x x x x x 
Note: All models include demographic controls, quadratic terms for air quality and precipitation, 
county, year, and season fixed effects, and county-specific linear time trends. Temperature bins 
count the number of days in each two-week period a child was exposed to temperatures in the 



















Figure 3-A1: Temperature and CPS reports, abuse  
 
Note: This figure shows the coefficients from separate regressions estimating the effect of days 
of exposure to temperatures in each of five bins relative to the excluded reference category (60-
75 degrees F) by children’s age in years. All models include demographic controls, quadratic 
terms for air quality and precipitation, county, year, and season fixed effects, and county-specific 
linear time trends. Data are NCANDS administrative CPS reports aggregated to the county-two-








Figure 3-A2: Temperature and CPS reports, neglect 
 
Note: This figure shows the coefficients from separate regressions estimating the effect of days 
of exposure to temperatures in each of five bins relative to the excluded reference category (60-
75 degrees F) by children’s age in years. All models include demographic controls, quadratic 
terms for air quality and precipitation, county, year, and season fixed effects, and county-specific 
linear time trends. Data are NCANDS administrative CPS reports aggregated to the county-two-









Figure 3-A3: The effect of a/c penetration on CPS reports by temperature bins  
 
Note: This figure shows the relationship between a/c penetration rate quartiles (q1) column 1, 
and (q4) in column 2, and CPS reports / 100,000 children and days of exposure to each 
temperature bin. This figure shows the coefficients from separate regressions estimating the 
effect of days of exposure to temperatures in each of five bins relative to the excluded reference 
category (60-75 degrees F) relative to a/c penetration rate quartiles. All models include 
demographic controls, quadratic terms for air quality and precipitation, county, year, and season 
fixed effects, and county-specific linear time trends. Data are NCANDS administrative CPS 
reports aggregated to the county-two-week period-age-race-maltreatment level for n=3,098,695 
observations in total.  
 
Table 3-A1: Continuous temperature and CPS reports 







Max temperature 0.047*** 0.540*** 
 (0.01) (0.10) 
Max^2 -0.003*** -0.034*** 
 (0.00) (0.01) 
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AQI^3 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Precip^3 -0.000*** -0.000** 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Child age in years (ref = < 12 months) 
One year -0.226*** -1.655*** 
 (0.02) (0.13) 
Two years -0.216*** -1.480*** 
 (0.03) (0.13) 
Three years -0.214*** -1.407*** 
 (0.03) (0.14) 
Four years -0.204*** -1.307*** 
 (0.03) (0.15) 
Five years -0.177*** -1.007*** 
 (0.03) (0.17) 
Child race (ref = white/non-Hispanic) 
Black 0.11 -0.24 
 (0.10) (0.47) 
Hispanic 0.12 -0.42 
 (0.19) (2.02) 
Other -0.811*** -4.998*** 
  (0.11) (0.98) 
Constant 0.427*** 25.337*** 
 (0.04) (0.52) 
r2 0.44 0.35 
N 1,959,509 1,959,509 
Season FE X X 
Year FE X X 
County FE X X 
County-LTT X X 
 
Note: All models include demographic controls, quadratic terms for air quality and precipitation, 
county, year, and season fixed effects, and county-specific linear time trends. Temperature is 
measured as the max daily temperature (divided by 10) in each two-week period. Data are 
NCANDS administrative CPS reports aggregated to the county-two-week period-age-race-
maltreatment level. 
 
Table 3-A2: Effect of a/c penetration rates by age, all reports 




1 year 2 years 3 years 4 years 5 years 
Panel A: Log (CPS reports)             
< 45 degrees -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** 
 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
a/c rate 0.08 -0.15 -0.11 -0.65 -0.54* -0.48 
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 (0.25) (0.41) (0.27) (0.36) (0.24) (0.26) 
< 45 degrees*a/c rate 0.01** 0.01* 0.01*** 0.01** 0.01* 0.01 
 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
60 - 45 degrees 0 -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01 -0.01 0 
 0.00  0.00  0.00  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
60 - 45 degrees*a/c rate 0.01 0.01* 0.01 0.01 0.01 0 
 0.00  (0.01) 0.00  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
75 - 90 degrees 0.01 0 0 0 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
75 - 90 degrees*a/c rate 0 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
90 - 105 degrees 0.02** 0.03*** 0.02 0.02** 0.01 0.02 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
90 - 105 degrees*a/c rate -0.02* -0.02** -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
>= 105 degrees 0.07 0.19 0.25* 0.13 -0.08 0.11 
 (0.18) (0.10) (0.11) (0.08) (0.11) (0.06) 
>= 105 degrees*a/c rate -0.07 -0.2 -0.25* -0.13 0.08 -0.11 
  (0.18) (0.10) (0.11) (0.08) (0.11) (0.07) 
Constant 50.25** 30.29* -10.74 27.75** 21.19* -20.02* 
 (15.23) (10.63) (8.79) (8.03) (7.90) (8.11) 
r2 0.58 0.48 0.47 0.46 0.45 0.43 
N 90,009 80,945 81,582 81,925 82,245 83,576 
Panel B: Reports/100,000 children           
< 45 degrees -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.07*** -0.07** -0.07*** -0.08*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
a/c rate -1.27 -2.77 -2.68 -5.30* -5.44* -5.49* 
 (2.50) (2.74) (2.11) (2.52) (2.30) (2.62) 
< 45 degrees*a/c rate 0.04*** 0.04* 0.05*** 0.04 0.05* 0.06** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
60 - 45 degrees -0.04* -0.07** -0.05** -0.06 -0.07 -0.06 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) 
60 - 45 degrees*a/c rate 0.05 0.06* 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.03 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) 
75 - 90 degrees 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.01 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.06) (0.09) 
75 - 90 degrees*a/c rate -0.01 -0.03 0 0 0 0 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.10) 
90 - 105 degrees 0.23*** 0.21*** 0.21** 0.15** 0.11 0.09 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.10) 
90 - 105 degrees*a/c rate -0.19*** -0.17*** -0.18** -0.11* -0.08 -0.09 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.09) 
>= 105 degrees 0.67 1.25** 1.93** 1.36** 0.64 1.43* 
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 (0.93) (0.35) (0.58) (0.41) (0.85) (0.66) 
>= 105 degrees*a/c rate -0.65 -1.27** -1.95** -1.39** -0.65 -1.47* 
  (0.95) (0.36) (0.59) (0.41) (0.86) (0.67) 









 (70.39) (35.12) (31.76) (27.84) (28.48) (34.09) 
r2 0.3 0.28 0.27 0.26 0.26 0.25 
N 90,009 80,945 81,582 81,925 82,245 83,576 
Season FE X X X X X X 
Year FE X X X X X X 
County FE X X X X X X 
County-LTT X X X X X X 
 
Note: All models include demographic controls, quadratic terms for air quality and precipitation, 
county, year, and season fixed effects, and county-specific linear time trends. Temperature bins 
count the number of days in each two-week period a child was exposed to temperatures in the 




Table 3-A3: Temperature bins and CPS reports / 100,000 children stratified by child age and 
maltreatment type 
 




1 year 2 years 3 years 4 years 5 years 
Panel A: All CPS reports 
< 45 degrees -0.02** 0.04*** 0.05*** 0.06*** 0.05*** 0.04*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
45 - 60 degrees 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
75 - 90 degrees 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.03** 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
90 - 105 
degrees 0.06*** 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.02* -0.02 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
>= 105 degrees 0.04** -0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.00 -0.03* 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
r2 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.36 0.36 0.34 
N 362027 317254 319109 319384 319884 321851 
Panel B: Abuse reports 
< 45 degrees 0.00 -0.01* -0.01** -0.01* -0.01 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
45 - 60 degrees 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
75 - 90 degrees 0.01* 0.01*** 0.01** 0.01** 0.00 -0.01 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
90 - 105 
degrees 0.01 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01** -0.01* -0.02* 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
>= 105 degrees 0.01 0.01* 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.02* 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
r2 0.55 0.62 0.62 0.61 0.59 0.55 
N 109039 88670 96428 103836 112186 124667 
Panel C: Neglect reports 
< 45 degrees -0.01* 0.03*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.03*** 0.02*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
45 - 60 degrees 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
75 - 90 degrees 0.04*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.02** 
 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  (0.01) 
90 - 105 
degrees 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.01* 
119 
 
 (0.01) 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
>= 105 degrees 0.04* 0.01 0.03*** 0.01 0.01 0.00 
  (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
r2 0.43 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.45 
N 305600 259763 259227 253525 249115 247748 
 
Note: All models include demographic controls, quadratic terms for air quality and precipitation, 
county, year, and season fixed effects, and county-specific linear time trends. Temperature bins 
count the number of days in each two-week period a child was exposed to temperatures in the 




Table 3-A4: Effect of LIHEAP on a/c penetration 
  (1) (2) 
LIHEAP 0.003* 0.001 
  (0.00) (0.00) 
Constant -32.842 -5.367 
 (18.56) (6.29) 
r2 0.983 0.818 
N 266,904 266,904 
Season FE X X 
Year FE X X 
County FE X X 
County-LTT  X 
 
Note: All models include demographic controls, quadratic terms for air quality and precipitation, 
county, year, and season fixed effects, and county-specific linear time trends. Temperature bins 
count the number of days in each two-week period a child was exposed to temperatures in the 
bin range. Data are NCANDS administrative CPS reports aggregated to the county-two-week 
period-age-race-maltreatment level. 
 
Table 3-A5: State LIHEAP program availability by month, 2014 - 2018 
 
Note: Full = full LIHEAP cooling program, None = no LIHEAP support available (may be 
available in other months, or as in 6 states, not at all). Statistics represent the 51 contiguous 










Full None Full None Full None Full None Full None Full None
2014 10 22 14 18 19 12 19 14 18 15 14 20
2015 10 21 14 17 17 14 19 13 16 16 13 19
2016 9 23 12 20 16 16 17 15 16 17 12 22
2017 9 23 12 19 16 16 17 16 16 17 12 22
2018 14 21 18 16 25 10 25 11 25 11 17 20
April May June July August September
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Table 3-A6: State LIHEAP program availability matrix, 2014 – 2018 
 
 


















































Full summer cooling program
Crisis-only summer cooling program
No summer cooling program






Child maltreatment is common, with as many as 1 in 8 children experiencing confirmed 
maltreatment before their 18th birthday (Wildeman et al., 2014). That maltreatment continues to 
increase in prevalence merits investigation into universal prevention strategies beyond targeted 
interventions. Policies that improve the parenting environment may be feasible alternatives to 
those directed at improving parenting behavior. Accordingly, the aim of my dissertation is to 
examine the externalities of in-place policies on child maltreatment: Medicaid, ECEC programs, 
and LIHEAP.  
In this dissertation, I extend the literature linking poverty to child maltreatment, finding that 
unequal access to health care and cooling may cause residual stress in the household, and that 
relieving this disparity could improve child safety. These findings are salient for state 
policymakers considering an expansion in Medicaid and LIHEAP policies and to those seeking 
maltreatment prevention strategies. As opposed to targeted, in-home interventions that seek to 
intervene after a crisis has occurred, the merit of expanding these policies is that they serve to 
affect a much larger population of at-risk children prior to the point of crisis. In this sense, my 
estimates are very conservative, as they pertain only to CPS records that measure observable 
maltreatment. In addition, the benefit of preventing unsafe parenting in early childhood is 
plausibly much larger in terms of later outcomes in middle childhood and adulthood. Further, 
that these policies have existing funding is particularly appealing, as scaling up a new 
intervention or policy – especially one targeted at maltreatment prevention – has proven difficult. 
The maltreatment externalities of expanding these policies should not be ignored in future cost-
benefit calculations.   
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These findings may serve practitioners as well by providing new evidence on the unseen factors 
that may spur a CPS report. Caseworkers should refer families to Medicaid as early in a child’s 
life as possible. In the event that the need disappears, the family is equipped to secure insurance 
regardless of their economic or household circumstances. Though the evidence on ECEC 
programs is much weaker in general, that young children appear to benefit from HS/EHS and 
CCDF subsidies implies that early CPS reports with an expressed need for child care assistance 
should be readily addressed, and seen as a preventative effort, rather than a secondary service. 
The relationship between temperature and child maltreatment might help CPS agencies 
anticipate service and staffing needs. Further, ensuring that families have access to LIHEAP or 
other state cooling support – in addition to all of their other, basic needs – might help reduce 
later CPS reports for the same families.  
Future research should seek to understand the pathways through which this set of policies affects 
children alongside other work-family and antipoverty policies that improve the household budget 
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